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Summary 
Human rights have their roots in citizen’s rights. The development of 
citizen’s rights has been centring on property rights. Property rights own its 
root to Rome.  
 
Private property rights are crucial elements in the Roman law, but were less 
recognized in the Middle Ages. Then it revives in the medieval cities. This 
thesis explores the development of property rights in Europe with the 
transformation of agricultural economy to commercial economy as the 
background, concluding that citizen’s rights are products of a commercial 
economy. The expansion of commercial economy to the world is the 
essence of colonization, particularly in its British version. Conflicts over 
colonization are among the causes of the two World Wars and the 
establishment of the United Nations, which in turn ushered an age of human 
rights. The thesis then explores China’s failed attempt to transform 
agricultural economy to commercial economy in a very broad historical 
context, which ultimately resulted in the emergence of a totalitarian regime 
in 1949. However, a totalitarian regime can be friendly to some human 
rights, as illuminated by the substantive poverty reduction during the last 
three decades’ economic growth. Unfortunately, economic growth alone is 
not enough to liberalize China, which is made clear by analysing China’s 
state report to the Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and 
the Committee’s Concluding Observations of said state report. Finally, the 
thesis draws the conclusion that transformation of land regime is the key for 
China’s full realization of human rights. 
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Preface 
The motive for this thesis is human dignity. Human dignity is well 
connected to human rights, as they are perceived in liberal states. However, 
a citizen from a non-liberal state normally has no knowledge of human 
rights and often inclines to go against such a connection. Therefore, as a 
Chinese citizen, before I present the discussion about human dignity and 
human rights. I shall first present my reasons. 
 
I was born in a peasant family in China and according to Chinese law that 
automatically makes me a peasant. The word peasant is a curse word, a 
synonym of second-class citizens, or inferior people. I developed a bad habit 
because of this fact: when people ask me where I am from, I automatically 
answer, ‘I am a peasant.’ I do this because I am afraid people might 
otherwise think they offend me or perhaps feel superior.  
   
Life in China is tough for peasants. For instance, peasants have no access to 
medical care, which in liberal states is provided by the government as a 
basic human right. People who have severe diseases, such as cancer, do not 
get treatment, and are bound to stay at home until death takes them. I often 
wonder if my father could afford regular physical examinations, would he 
still die in his bed of cancer.  
   
One of my neighbouring families was fined 3000 yuan1, for violating the 
one-child policy. This family consisted of three people; a man in his 80s, his 
son who was deaf and mute and the son’s wife who was mentally retarded. 
The fine was approximately half to one thirds the family’s yearly income. If 
the fine was not paid, the local authority would force the couple to abort the 
baby. The couple got pregnant with their first child after twenty years of 
marriage. This was their first baby so the couple obviously did not violate 
the one-child policy. The authority claimed that they were punished because 
they did not apply for permission beforehand, which was an outright excuse 
to blackmail people. The family borrowed money to pay the fine in order to 
be able to keep the child. Several years later, the old man became sicker, 
barely able to help support the family. One day he left home and never came 
back.  
   
Childhood friends from my village are not doing well either. One girl for 
instance who was pretty and cute could not find a decent job when she grew 
up and ended up as a prostitute in the city, which is illegal by Chinese law. 
At the time, I graduated from Law School and worked in the same city as a 
policeman I saw a flood of prostitutes in town. I knew she was somewhere 
among them, earning money at the cost of her dignity. I handled prostitutes 
occasionally. I felt lucky that I never had her before me. 
   
                                                 
1 1 USD= 7.24 yuan, 1 Euro= 10.77 yuan, 15 January, 2008 
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There is one good thing about being a peasant: you get to understand this 
country. China has, for thousands of years, been and will in the near future 
remain an agriculture-based civilization. People legally identified as 
peasants constituted 57% of the population in 2005. They are the true colour 
of the country. However, they are also mute, deeply despised, and excluded 
from the vision of the country. This could explain why most studies of 
China are not completely accurate. The foreigners or the Chinese townsmen, 
who normally are the researchers, do not see the real China. Only a peasant 
going through all the traumas and insults can really see China. 
   
I started wondering when I was eleven: do we deserve dignity? And if we 
do, why? How do we achieve dignity? By saying ‘we’ I mean my father, the 
old man, the girl, my fellow villagers, and me. Since rural China is a 
homogeneous conglomerate of villages, ‘we’ also means all Chinese 
peasants. Because the fate of the peasants defines the fate of China, ‘we’ 
also means all Chinese, who are all insulted and humiliated for not enjoying 
dignity. ‘The focus of human rights is on the life and dignity of human 
beings.’2 In this thesis, I try to analyse China and human rights from a 
peasant’s eyes. Even though my approach might have universal application 
to all Chinese, my ultimate concern is the people of my village. 
   
I am very grateful to Raoul Wallenberg Institute, for offering me the 
opportunity to conduct this research. And to my supervisor, Professor 
Asbjørn Eide, who has been guiding and encouraging me throughout the 
process of this thesis. 
   
I am deeply indebted to Sweden and Ray Huang for this research. I studied 
in Sweden during 2002-03 as a master student. It was the first time I lived 
abroad. I learned liberty from the trivia details of life, such as the spirit of 
the people, the smile on the cashiers’ face and the way people say hi to 
strangers. This knowledge is indispensable in order for me to understand 
Ray Huang’s work. Huang is an American - Chinese historian, who 
unfortunately past away in 2000. He developed the unconventional macro 
history view focusing on the long trends of history, overlooking the details. 
According to his scholarship, the history of the world evolves around certain 
inherent logics. The ultimate reason China was left behind in the 19th 
century according to Huang was that China was not ‘mathematically 
manageable’, while the liberal states were. The term ‘mathematically 
manageable’, however, is difficult to understand. Five years after my first 
contact with Huang´s work, studying at the Raoul Wallenberg Institute, I 
interpret the term as the inalienable characters of the commercial economy, 
which require independence, sovereignty, rule of law, market mechanisms, 
property rights, and so on. In short, it requires human rights. 
  
 
                                                 
2 Manfred Nowak, Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2003, p. 1. 
 3
1 Introduction  
1.1 The background 
One of the greatest achievements of mankind in the 20th century is the 
establishment of the United Nations. The mission of the UN is to maintain 
international peace, security and respect for human rights, as stated in the 
Preamble of the UN Charter. However, the two aims are to some extent 
contradictory with each other. One of the core notions of sovereignty is non-
interference. According to the classic international law theory, the 
international community does not interfere into internal affairs of a state, 
which is also laid down as a constitutional principle of the organization in 
the UN Charter. Nonetheless, the Art 2(7) of the UN Charter constitutes an 
exception to the non-intervention principle. The Security Council is vested 
with the power to interfere with a state if the Security Council determines 
the existence of threats or breaches of peace or aggression. Gross violations 
of human rights are sometimes regarded threats of peace and are subject to 
intervention.3 Hence, human rights can penetrate the shield of sovereignty. 
Moreover, human rights were coined into the International Bill of Human 
Rights and other international documents. Through the international human 
rights regime, human rights are obliged in all Member States. 
 
The mass adoption of human rights into international treaties resulted from 
the scourge of the Second World War, which proved that trespassing of 
human rights within one states could lead to wars abroad. Human rights 
thereafter have taken precedence over sovereignty, which is likely to be an 
important explanation for the accomplishment of world peace in the UN 
age. Furthermore, the triumph of human rights has substantively changed 
the international environment, and the game of the international community 
with it: from military expansion and arms race to development. Japan, for 
instance, came back to the international community as an economic 
superpower rather than a military power. This illustrates that military power 
no longer is the decisive factor of a state’s international status, legitimacy of 
the regime, or even existence. It is fully illuminated by the dissolution of the 
USSR. This change also leads to the change of how international relations 
work. The international relations in the colonial age was characterised by 
military race. States tried to contain each other from growing strong. 
However, in the game of development, international relations feature with 
interdependence. States are generally willing to see other states growing 
strong, except militarily. 
 
In the age of colonialism, the world had separated into two: the West and 
the rest. Military power was the demarcation line. There is also a separation 
in the UN age: the developed and the less developed. Development became 
                                                 
3 For instance, the apartheid in South Africa was regarded as threat to world peace. The 
Security Council authorized sanction against South Africa since 1963 until the abolishment. 
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the new line. The colonial powers were all liberal states featured with a 
complete citizen’s rights system. In the UN age, the developed states have 
complete human rights institutions, and the less developed states are those 
that have not. Citizen’s rights are forerunners to human rights. A positive 
connection is assumed between development and human rights. 
Development is regarded as a result of the triumph of human rights. Human 
rights did not penetrate into the Eastern Bloc and most Third World states 
because of the Cold War and other reasons. This was widely accepted as the 
reason why these states did not achieve great development. When the Cold 
War entered its latter period, human rights’ new implication for 
development, on top of its role for world peace, was well received. The 
developed sates have been incorporating human rights in their diplomatic 
policies. The understanding of the connection between human rights, 
development and international cooperation is fully expressed in the 
Declaration on the Right to Development. ‘The right to development is an 
inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all 
peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, 
social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.’4 ‘States have the duty to co-
operate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles 
to development’.5 In the international relations and cooperation, the human 
rights-based development was best represented by development compact, 
such as the Cotonou Agreement.  
   
However, international efforts to promote human rights and development in 
the less developed world are not very effective. Neoliberal reforms in the 
Latin-American states and the ‘shock therapy’ in the former Eastern Bloc 
states produced economic catastrophes. Subsequently, Russia and some 
Latin American states adopted approaches contrary to the Washington 
Consensus policies. In addition, most developing states receiving aid 
packages perform disappointingly. Ironically, the major development 
phenomenon happened in China, the last stronghold opposing liberalist 
human rights. Therefore, pre-1980s development and prosperity was limited 
to the states upholding human rights. In the post-1980s, however, countries 
in the less developed world newly accepting human rights system performed 
frustratingly. China, a state perceived by the world as opposing human 
rights, performed the other way around. This scene is dramatically 
controversial. 
   
As a basic fact, a citizen’s rights system is not easily fitted into an existing 
society. Even in Europe, it cost a series of violent wars to establish the 
citizen’s rights dominance, such as the Thirty Years’ War, the English 
Revolution, and the French Revolution. One important point about 
liberalization is that it depends very much on the situation of individual 
states and therefore no unified model is available. No liberalization case was 
found resembling another. Any successful liberalization cases more or less 
make exceptions to the existing models, and expand the database of 
                                                 
4 Declaration on the Right to Development, art 1.1. 
5 Declaration on the Right to Development, art 3.3. 
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liberalization models. However, after the liberalization has taken place, the 
citizen’s rights systems in all liberal states are similar, so that an 
international human rights regime is possible.  
   
The UN stated, in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, that it proclaimed ‘this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end 
that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration 
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote 
respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national 
and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and 
observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and 
among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.’ While 
representatives of many states from different parts of the world participated 
in the drafting of the Declaration, it is nevertheless clear that the rights 
included in the Declaration were those that had emerged in the Western 
liberal states from the 17th century and onwards. It has been argued that with 
the adoption of this Declaration, the United Nations initiated a human rights 
project with the purpose to promote the recognition and enjoyment of 
human rights worldwide.6 However, there is only few cases of successful 
liberalization since the adoption of the Declaration, mainly the Asian Tigers: 
Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. None of the Tigers 
liberalized in the classic model set in the Declaration. Taiwan and South 
Korea began with military dictatorship for decades, and Hong Kong and 
Singapore are not democratic even by today. The international human rights 
regime can serve as a measurement of liberalization, but it is not a solution 
for liberalization.  
 
China is also one of the exceptions. Even though the Chinese economic 
miracle has been lasting for three decades, and so far there does not seem to 
be an end to the economic boom. There is still a long way to a human rights 
system for China. However, China has already started challenging the 
mainstream human rights concept. The transfer of sovereignty of Hong 
Kong from the UK to China breaks the conventional notion of sovereignty 
as containing ultimate authority over internal affairs. Under the ‘one 
country, two system’ structure, the central government of the People’s 
Republic of China does not control any affairs of Hong Kong, except 
defence and diplomacy. Hong Kong has her own judicial system, 
independent legislative body, border control, passports, currency, customs, 
and so on. In addition, Hong Kong does not pay any tax to the PRC 
government. The Hong Kong experiences, therefore, changed the notion of 
sovereignty.  
 
China is still far from liberalization. Due to China’s long history and unique 
social structure, the future development of China will challenge the current 
human rights theory, as the USSR influenced the formation of the 
                                                 
6 See Asbjørn Eide, Making human rights universal, Human Rights in Development 
Yearbook 1999/2000, Kluwer Law International, 2001. 
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international human rights regime, even though the USSR herself was not 
liberalized.  
1.2 The research hypotheses 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the structural conditions for the 
emergence and acceptance of human rights. The main research question of 
this thesis is the hypothesis that human rights can be comprehensively 
implemented only in liberal societies. Two basic necessary conditions for 
the existence of a liberal society are that private property and rule of law are 
recognised in that society.  
   
A second hypothesis is that human rights could not emerge before societies 
moved from primarily agricultural to commercial and industrial economy. 
Although extensive private commerce may emerge from a traditional 
agricultural society, a liberal society with rule of law and comprehensive 
recognition of private property could not exist in a traditional agricultural 
society. The further development of commerce buries agriculture political 
regimes. 
   
A third hypothesis is that human rights, which are initially a product of 
Western liberalism, were not possible unless private property was 
established to be the main pillar in the economy, with its attendant political 
consequences of freedom 
   
To explore these hypotheses I shall process vast time, space and events in 
very limited pages. I seek to show that human rights are long-term history 
trend and they can be used as the key to understand the history of the world 
and China.  
   
I analyse the different historical regimes in the term of their economic and 
financial bases. I start with the great agriculture civilization which sustained 
for centuries, the Roman Empire. Then I go through the decline of the 
Roman Empire, the emergence of the feudal system in Europe, and the rise 
of liberal powers, concluding that the reason for this change is the 
replacement of a commercial economy over an agricultural economy, all to 
test my hypothesis that human rights are the inherent requirements of a 
commercial economy. The rise of human rights is a natural result of the rise 
of commercial economy. 
   
In the case of China, I describe her failed transformation of the agricultural 
economy to a commercial economy, and the subsequently turn to 
totalitarianism in order to defend her independence. I look into the economic 
development that has happened in China in the last thirty years, pointing out 
the consequences of developing a commercial economy without 
implementing a human rights system. Showing that commerce without 
widespread private property is not sufficient to ensure a human rights 
culture in the country. In the conclusion, I will argue that the land 
transformation is a key to realization of human rights system in China in 
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that it will lead to a property regime and widespread recognition of private 
property.  
   
For the thesis I draw mainly on historical studies, in particular those that 
work within the field of macro-history. The most important sources for this 
thesis have been the Capitalism and 21st century (in Chinese), by Ray 
Huang and China: a macro history, by Ray Huang. China, a new history by 
John K. Fairbank, the Cambridge history of China series, Mediaeval history 
by Carl Stephenson and Bryce Lyon and A history of the world by Hugh 
Thomas are important source of references in this thesis. 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
In Chapter One, I present the background to the thesis and explain the 
research question as well as the methodology used to respond to the 
research question. In Chapter Two, I examine more closely the concepts and 
effects of human right, and then the evolution of law and later of human 
rights in the Western society. I examine the Roman Empire, the feudalist 
period that followed the breakdown of the Roman Empire, the emergence of 
the city-states and of citizens’ rights in the later stage of the feudal era, 
followed by an exploration of the emergence of the European nation-states 
from the Peace of Westphalia. I examine the emergence of the notions of 
sovereignty and the rule of law, the notions of sovereignty and 
independence, the link between sovereignty and human rights and the 
formation of liberalism. 
   
Chapter Three examines the developments from the Age of Colonialism to 
the Age of Human Rights: It describes the process of colonization, the 
colonization effects in Europe and in the colonies. It examines the role of 
the United Nations, the Soviet effects on Human Rights, and explores some 
aspects of Chinese Development including Shenzhen and Hong Kong, and 
investigates the role played by the UK. This is followed in Chapter Four by 
discussing the situation in China 221 BC-1842 AD, going from Centralism 
to Absolutism. Chapter Five examines the transplanting of a Commerce 
System into China, its limitations and problematic aspects, and the uses of 
alternatives to property rights, to market systems and to the rule of law. The 
chapter introduces the important distinction between Treaty-port China and 
Inland China – the first is commercial, the latter is agricultural. 
   
Chapter Six examines modern China from a human rights perspective, 
arguing that there is a miscommunication on human rights in non-liberal 
states. This is investigated among others through an examination of the state 
report presented by China to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and of the concluding observations made by that 
Committee regarding Chinese performance in implementing the Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
   
Chapter Seven contains my conclusion, that although China is undertaking 
liberalization on her own, it has a global implication, and the international 
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community shall cooperate in this process by exerting their influence in the 
transformation of the land regime. 
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2 The Evolvement of Citizen’s 
Rights: Property rights, Legal 
System, Rule of Law, and 
Sovereignty 
2.1 The Concept 
2.1.1 Human and Rights 
Human rights formally entered the international law as binding obligations 
for all nations in 1945 with the proclamation of the UN Charter. However, 
human rights as citizen’s rights in national law date well before 1945. As 
early as in the 18th century, the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 and the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 has uttered 
human rights, in the sense of individual rights. Citizen’s rights are 
forerunners of human rights, especially when it comes to civil and political 
rights. The major difference between human rights and citizen’s rights is 
their relations to sovereignty. Citizen’s rights are considered internal affairs 
and are not of concern for the international law, while human rights are part 
of international law.  
 
Certain features of human rights can be read from the name. ‘Human’ rights, 
as opposed to ‘privileged’ rights, refer to universalism, the rights that all 
human beings in the world shall be entitled to. It implies equality. Equality 
is an inherent notion of citizen’s rights. Historians have found that human 
beings lived in equality for a long time. However, the agriculture revolution 
set off a chain reaction of urbanization, class differences, and social 
cleavage that undermined the appealing equality of primitive society.7 The 
agriculture civilizations witnessed the fall of equality. All great agriculture 
civilizations ruled out equality in the political, philosophical and religious 
systems, such as Monarch, dictatorship, despotism, absolutism, 
Confucianism, Hinduism, and Christianity. Equality reappeared in the 
liberal Europe as one of the high principals of the political structure of the 
liberal state. Not just a coincidence, the liberal states were not agriculture 
civilization.  
 
‘Right’, in a legal context it is a legal concept denoting an advantage or 
benefit conferred on a person by rules of a particular legal system.8 Hence, a 
legal system is the premise of rights. A legal system is enforceable only 
when backed up by a political power. Political power derives from the 
monopoly of military force within a certain region. One of the most 
                                                 
7 L. S. Stavrianos, A Global History, Prentice Hall, 1991, pp. 9-14. 
8 David M. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law, Clarendon Press, 1980, p. 1070. 
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important ancient legal systems is the Roman law. The Roman law 
delivered rights. However, the Roman law did not deliver equality. Equality 
before law comes only after rule of law. Rule of law implies the 
subordination of all authorities, legislative, executive, judicial, and other 
organs to certain principles that would generally be accepted as characters 
of law. It also implies respect for the supreme value and dignity of 
individuals.9 Rule of man, however, is a more natural consequence since a 
legal system is a product of military monopoly. Rule of law is diametrically 
opposed to, and very likely to ruin the military monopoly. The collapse of 
military monopoly will inevitably result in loss of order, instead of offering 
rule of law. It is only after complicated economical, social, and political 
evolvements that rule of law can be achieved without jeopardizing order. As 
a rule, the military force belongs to one person or group in all kinds of non-
liberal nations. The military force belongs to the nation in a liberal state. A 
process of military nationalization is a character of the liberalization 
process. 
 
2.1.2 The Effects of Human Rights  
 
The international community set up the universal human rights standard. 
The realization of human rights, nevertheless, is essentially a domestic 
process. Therefore, human rights are of regional or national differences and 
peculiarities. Hence, human rights are compared among states. Measured by 
the situation, all states can be categorized into two groups, liberal and non-
liberal states. Liberal states practice human rights, and non-liberal states do 
not.  
 
In the era of the UN, human rights measurement is employed in virtually all 
fields of the UN, even outside the UN. Then there is a question of 
measuring human rights in non-liberal states. 
 
Non-liberal states are not rule of law states. Therefore, it is not possible to 
measure human rights of non-liberal states in a legal approach. However, it 
is possible to measure human rights of non-liberal states in an indirect 
approach: measuring human dignity and freedom in non-liberal states. 
Human dignity and freedoms are the ultimate value and aim of human 
rights. Better human rights bring broader dignity and freedom to people, and 
vice versa. The effects can be measured and compared, not only among 
liberal states but also non-liberal states. Even though there equally lack 
human rights among non-liberal states, they are of different situation of 
human dignity and freedoms. For instance, comparing 1978 and 2007, it is 
widely accepted that the human rights situation in China improved, even 
though technically human rights do not exist in either year.  
 
The human rights measurement in non-liberal states has a legitimacy issue. 
Why should non-liberal states be measured by human rights if they barely 
understand the concept of human rights? Why they cannot live by their non-
                                                 
9 Ibid., p. 1093. 
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liberal way as they have been living for thousands of years? Is it fair that 
China is measured by human rights, but Europe is not measured by 
Confucianism values?  
 
Yes, it is fair according to realism politics, ‘the standard of justice depends 
on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the Strong do what they 
have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.’10 
Before the 19th century, all tributary states of China were measured by 
Confucian merits, which was also fair. The Western powers have build up 
predominance over the world, and an international order. Under the UN 
roof, member states enjoy sovereignty and bear human rights obligations.  
 
In the human rights measuring, it is therefore crucial to differentiate liberal 
states and non-liberal states. It is not easy to define the benchmark because 
more or less any state today adopts some sort of human rights. Even North 
Korea ratified Convention on the Rights of the Child. Nevertheless, certain 
rights exist in both liberal and non-liberal states, and certain rights exist only 
in liberal states. When analyzing, human rights are divided into civil and 
political rights and then economic, social and cultural rights. The economic, 
social and culture rights, which were mainly pushed by the Eastern Bloc, are 
not a good benchmark since these countries are not liberal.  
 
The civil and political rights include the passive civil rights of non-
interference (above all by state) and active political rights of participation 
define the democratic freedom towards the state.11 Considering that by the 
19th century all the major European liberal powers were not democratic, 
political rights cannot be a good benchmark. International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights sets a comprehensive list of civil rights. 
Nonetheless, none of them serves as a good benchmark, because none of 
them can be found in ancient Europe, from which the modern Europe 
evolves. There is, however, one right omitted by the Covenant, the property 
rights. 
  
The property rights are found in all liberal states and missing in all former 
states of the Eastern Bloc. It is the right that is too important to be listed in 
the Covenant. It is the only civil right that can also be traced in ancient 
Rome.  
2.2 Property rights in the Roman Law 
2.2.1 The Roman Empire: a Centralistic State 
Since the emergence approximately 100,000 years ago, human beings have 
been living under the mercy of nature.12 Humans were able to achieve 
                                                 
10 The Melian dialogue, see John Baylis and Steven Smith, The Globalization of World 
Politics: An Introduction to World Politics, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2005, p. 168. 
11 Manfred Nowak, supra note 2, p.10. 
12 W. H. McNeill, A World History, Oxford, 1979, p.7. 
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security against natural powers only after the agriculture revolution which 
brought civilization into human history around 4000 B.C.13 The 
productivity leap provided necessary tools for humans to build up economy, 
the mechanism helping humans to overcome natural threats, such as 
weather, hunger or predators. Economy is the utilization of natural resources 
under certain technologies for human welfare. The resources and production 
of economy were property. Property, not like natural resources, could only 
serve welfare of humans accomplishing the necessary technologies.  
 
Freed from natural power, humans only found themselves facing a much 
more intimidating threat which was the human contention for property, both 
from outside and inside the society. Security and order were then the largest 
concern. States emerged to achieve these two targets. The forms of state 
evolved corresponding to the updates of the art of war. Both forms of states 
and arts of war relied upon the advancement of technology and economy. 
The competition for security among countries was endless, because any 
standing military organization was a threat to others and should be 
conquered. The continuality of warfare led to only one winner, Rome in the 
case of the West. The Roman Empire ended the major wars, establishing 
order and security mechanisms in this region.  
 
Proper arrangements of international relations were indispensable for 
security. International relations were about how states which were capable 
of inflicting military actions against each other dealt with one another. The 
Roman Empire maintained an international order. The international order of 
that age was different from the international order under the UN framework. 
First, there was not a global international order in the Roman age. This was 
because of the agricultural economy which could not provide necessary 
technological methods to support deploying military forces all around the 
world. Instead there were several regional international orders in the world. 
Second, to survive the war for security, countries in the Roman age needed 
to mobilize all possible resource. Only the country with the best 
mobilization capacity could be independent. Centralism was a mechanism 
where the state’s mobilization power reached all individuals, for instance 
through the tax system, and one person or group, such as the monarch, 
controlled the whole system.14 Therefore, a centralised state, like the Roman 
Empire, or the Han Dynasty of China, stood to the end. Third, in 
international orders of the Roman age, the international relations are 
realistic. The conquering power increased not only the size but the security 
of the empire.15 It was not possible for states to coexist peacefully and 
equally under realist international relations. However, this is not really a 
difference. It is said the international relations in the UN age are liberalistic. 
Even though states in the UN age roughly coexist peacefully and equally, 
the international relations are still realistic.  The difference between the 
realism of the Roman age and the UN age is that, in the Roman age, the 
                                                 
13 Ibid., pp. 13-15. 
14 From Babylon to China, from India to Aztec America, all despots sought their percentage 
of every crop. See Hugh Thomas, A history of the world, Harper& Row, 1979, p. 163. 
15 The Melian Dialogue, see Baylis and Smith, supra note 10. 
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strong want the weak to be dependent and inferior, while in the UN age, the 
strong want the weak to be independent and equal, and implementing 
human rights. 
2.2.2 Agricultural economy and Property rights 
The Roman Empire was an extremely centralised state. Probably only the 
Han dynasty of China can be more centralised than the Roman Empire at 
their time. Roman Empire maintained a strong and well-developed legal 
system. One of the core features of the Roman law is the protection for 
private property, especially land.16 The land ownership included the rights 
to own crops, to manage and to trade the land. 
  
Property rights by nature was a mechanism by which the farmers paid tax 
and soldier services and received security. The Roman property rights were 
the mobilization and security mechanism of the agricultural economy, 
which was co-produced by the agricultural economy and the centralistic 
political structure. It created an ideal balance between the production and 
the defence activities. It properly distributed the resources for welfare and 
security purposes.  
  
The features of the agricultural economy were coined into the land regime. 
The agriculture production depended enormously on growth circles of crops 
which took months. During the growth circle, natural conditions, such as the 
quality of land, the species of crop and the weather, were at count for the 
production. It was not possible to modify the growth circle before the gene 
engineering technology. Therefore, agriculture was insensitive to 
technological advancement. The gravest concern was security. When 
planting, the farmers had to be sure that they were going to harvest. Threats 
mainly came from foreign invasion, government trespassing, and 
infringement from private parties. Property rights was the mechanism to 
overcome government trespassing and infringement from private parties. 
The tax funded the military mobilization safeguarding the economy from 
invasion. The ultimate purpose of property rights was to safeguard the 
owners control over their property. 
  
The Roman property rights had the emphasis on land and could hence be 
named agricultural property rights, which should be differentiated from 
modern property rights. Property rights naturally included the right to 
disposal of property.17 Hence, exchange of property was legally established, 
which led to the door of trade. Trade was an important part of the Roman 
economy.18  
                                                 
16 Private ownership on immovables was established as early as 450 BC, see György 
Diósdi, Ownership in ancient and preclassical Roman law, Budapest, 1970, p. 40.   
17 Fritz Schulz, Classical Roman law, Oxford, 1951, pp.343-354. 
18 ’Development toward a trading economy was one of the new features of the second 
century’, see Marcel Le Glay, Jean-Louis Voisin, Yann Le Bohec, A history of Rome, 
Blackwell, 1996, p. 106. ’Roman economy was predominantly based on farming, 
essentially agriculture... the non-agriculture sector of the Roman economy was of 
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Commercial economy developed into the dominant economy when Europe 
entered the liberal age. Commercial economy harboured the modern 
property rights, or the commerce property rights, which are closely related 
but significantly different from the Roman property rights. The objects of 
the Roman property rights are only movables and immovables,19 and land is 
the major concern of the immovable property,20 while the line of objects of 
modern property rights extends far wider, such as intellectual property, to 
adopt the characters of the modern economy. The differences between a 
commercial economy and an agricultural economy are responsible for all the 
differences between the two property regimes.  
 
The productivity of the agricultural economy depended on natural 
conditions, little on technological advancement. Hence, the agriculture 
production was stable and predictable. On the other hand, industrial 
production was given birth by technology, and the productivity greatly 
relied on technological advancements. It was not predictable. The focal 
point of the agriculture production was certainty, while the emphasis of a 
commercial economy was progressiveness. The more crucial difference was 
the economic resource employed. In agricultural economy, land was the 
only controllable factors in the whole production process. The top concern 
of the agricultural economy was the distribution of land. The economic 
resources employed in commercial economy were, however, virtually 
unlimited, restricted only by technology. The top concern of commercial 
economy was therefore distribution and exchangeability of economic 
resources. Although exchange was implied in the agricultural property 
rights, and trade existed in the agricultural economy, full exchangeability 
did not exist under agricultural civilizations. Full exchangeability required 
equality. However, equality was not possible in a centralistic regime from 
which the agricultural property rights came. 
 
Agricultural economy conflicted with commercial economy in that the 
former had less concern on equality, and actually relied on political 
centralism which inherently opposed equality. Under the structure of 
agricultural property rights plus political centralism, commercial economy 
was able to survive, but not able to fully develop.21
 
The agricultural regimes, however, had been proved to be non-sustainable. 
The agricultural property rights implied trade of land. The trade of land had 
finally buried the base of the centralistic regimes in Europe, and were 
subsequently replaced by liberalistic regimes. 
 
                                                                                                                            
considerable importance at the regional level and that some cities show a degree of 
specialization in their commercial and/or manufacturing activity.’ See David S. Potter, A 
companion to the Roman Empire, Blackwell, 2006, pp. 284-285. 
19 Schulz, Supra note 17. 
20 Ibid, pp. 338-380 
21 For instance, as early as 218, a lex Claudia had attempted to prohibit senators from 
engaging in any lucrative activity based on trade. See Le Glay, Voisin, Bohec, supra note 
18. 
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Rome’s success rested partly on a numerous and hardy peasantry. Farms in 
the Republican and early Empire Rome used to be small and family owned, 
and Roman farmers were the primary tax source and the backbone of the 
army.22 However, large estates owned by a politically privileged senatorial 
class flourished. For instance, the latifundium owned by the younger Pliny 
was worth twenty million sesterces, twenty times larger than the minimum 
property qualification for the Roman senate, one million sesterces.23 L. 
Tarius Rufus, an admiral of Augustus, invested and lost 100 million 
sesterces in land.24 Large estates were able to avoid taxes and soldier 
obligations to the state, and used slave labour extensively.25 Exploitation by 
the state in the form of prolonged, mass recruitment into the army, high 
taxation26, the disruption of civil wars and economic pressure from the rich, 
had drastically undermined the position of the free peasantry of the middle 
and late Republic. The collapse of the independent peasantry is a cliché of 
Roman agrarian history.27 With the economy evolvement, the political 
situation entered into a new stage. In this stage, owners of large estate 
mastered significant resources. They were able to organize their own 
defence. On the other hand, the tax and soldier sources of the central 
government dried up when independent peasants disappeared. Consequently 
its role as the security mechanism outdated. This precipitated the decline of 
the Roman Empire. Europe entered the Middle Ages featuring with 
manorialism and feudalism. 
2.3 The Medieval Europe: Decentralization 
and Coexistence 
2.3.1 Manorialism 
The decline of the Roman Empire uncovered a chaotic and desperate page 
of Western Europe. Lost of imperial order had heavy impacts on economic 
life. The most fundamental one probably was that, commercial decay was 
thus unchecked, with the consequence that society became more and more 
thoroughly agrarian.28 However, as far as rural life was concerned, there can 
be no doubt that the Roman villa persisted under the barbarian conquerors.  
The model for the Carolingian manor was the great estate of the later 
empire.29 By the fifth century the mass of the agricultural population in the 
                                                 
22 Medium-sized and small properties seem to have been preponderant at the Third Century 
BC. The war and conquest in this century contributed to the formation of the first large-
scale properties. Military service was both a right and a duty of the citizen, and it included 
no mercenaries in this century. See Ibid., pp. 68-70. 
23 Peter Garnsey & Richard Saller, The Roman Empire: economy, society and culture, 
Duchworth, 1987, p.64. 
24 Ibid., p. 67. 
25 Ibid., pp. 71-73. 
26 The land tax commonly amounted to a third of the crop on a peasant farm. See N.J.G. 
Pounds, An economic history of Medieval Europe, Longman, 1974, p.16. 
27 Ibid., pp. 76. 
28 Carl Stephenson and Bryce Lyon, Mediaeval history, Harper & Low, 1962, p. 158. 
29 Ibid., p. 159. 
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west had already become an economically dependent peasantry. And as the 
greater landlords rapidly acquired grants of immunity, the dependence of the 
peasantry tended to become also political. These agrarian arrangements 
were in general left unchanged by the barbarians, who merely took over a 
share of the existing estates and allowed them to be cultivated as before. 
Even the distinction between the invaders and the native Romans soon 
vanished.30 At the opening of the eleventh century, the manorial system was 
practically universal throughout Western Europe, while feudalism was not. 
A manor remained exactly the same, whether or not it was held by a vassal 
in return for feudal service.31  
  
The manor may be defined as an agricultural estate possessed by a lord. In 
other words, the manor was a unit of seigniorial exploitation. The authority 
of the mediaeval lord, thanks to the lavish dispersal of royal privilege, had 
generally come to be political as well as economic. Rights that we should 
distinguish as public and private had been inextricably confused.32 
Subsequently, property rights as a core notion of the Roman law was barely 
recognized in the Middle Ages. Transfer of land in the Middle Ages 
conducted through fief instead of contracts. The manorial system flourished 
on all sides because under it, and under it alone, the mass of the people 
found the possibility of livelihood. The lord owed his dominant position not 
so much to his own rapacious greed as to the defenceless condition of the 
countryside and the vital needs of the inhabitants.33 The peasants’ life was 
reasonably secure. Under the lord’s protection he was assured at least of 
subsistence; even serfdom was infinitely better than the constant fear of 
death by violence or starvation.34 Receiving protection and land from the 
lord, peasants paid unrestricted responsibility to the lord, including 
payments and labour service. Peasants were personally bound to the land, so 
were their children. As the most crucial difference from the Roman age, 
peasants did not bear responsibility directly to the state, which had 
profoundly influenced the political and military mechanisms. 
2.3.2 Feudalism 
As mentioned above, the manor was a defence unit as well as an economic 
unit. The lord was responsible of providing security. Under the feudalism 
arrangements, a lord justified his privilege through a grant of immunity or 
other delegation of authority by the king. A man became a vassal of a lord 
through ceremony of homage. A vassal as a fief-holder possessed manors 
that included peasant cultivators free or unfree. Along with his fief the 
vassal received from his lord a guarantee of protection and justice; in return 
he owned the lord various forms of service and assistance, very commonly 
mounted soldiers or knights. Each vassal could in turn give fiefs to vassals 
                                                 
30 Ibid., pp. 159-160. 
31 Ibid., p. 220. 
32 Ibid., p. 221. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 225. 
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of his own.35 The picture of the feudal military machinery is now clear. 
Feudal kings had no mobilization power like the Roman Emperors did, 
because the Roman Emperor had direct control on farmers while the Feudal 
kings received financial and military service on a feudal contractual basis. 
The state power had thus decentralized. The feudal kings’ power in 
mobilization was significantly compromised. It is shown in the scale of 
armies. The Roman army at its zenith in the second century AD included 
400,000 men in all. The King of France commanded the largest army in 
feudal Europe at Crécy: 12,000 men. The German Emperor’s all-out 
offensive against the Turks in 1467 numbered a mere 18,500. In comparison, 
under the Song dynasty (961-1279), China had trained several million 
men.36 Since the feudal kings’ capacity to engage in wars was seriously 
degraded, the situation of coexistence came into shape. 
 
Coexistence was a situation where the states which could inflict military 
action upon each other could not conquer or control one another. Conquests 
were conducted through wars. The results of wars depended on the capacity 
of military mobilization of the invaders and the defenders respectively. In 
the thoroughly mobilized centralistic state, a state’s offense capacity 
equalled its defense capacity. However, in a decentralized feudal state, the 
situation differed.  
 
Feudal kingdoms were politically decentralized, so that their capacity to 
mobilize was heavily restricted. However, the centralistic administrative 
system inherited from the Roman Empire remained. Feudal kingdoms were 
able to mobilize maximum resources for defence. This mechanism 
functioned when being invaded. Subsequently, even though wars were 
abundant in the Middle Ages, few were decisive, and none brought Europe 
back into one regime. 
 
There were also economic reasons for coexistence. Agriculture was a self-
sufficient economy. It was not economically aggressive like outward 
commercial economy. The aggressiveness of an agricultural nation was 
inspired mainly by defensive purposes, and it only featured a nation of 
peasants: a centralistic state. The feudal nations were nations of lords. Lords 
were in great hesitation to support mobilization exceeding the need for 
defence, especially in aggressive wars. The military expense was high, and 
it did not bring proper reward. Moreover, the risk of military defeat was 
unmanageable. In short, feudal states were more mobilized as a defender 
than as an invader. Hence the invaders were militarily inferior to the 
defender.  
 
According to Kant, non-republican states were more likely to engage in 
wars, while the republicans tend to perpetual peace, because in a republic 
the decision-makers are bearers of war costs. In a non-republican state, a 
declaration of war is the easiest thing to decide upon, because war does not 
require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and not a member of the state, the 
                                                 
35 Ibid., pp.203-208. 
36 Thomas, supra note 14, p. 70. 
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least sacrifice of the pleasures of his table, the chase, his country houses, his 
court functions, and the like. He may, therefore, resolve on war for the most 
trivial reasons, and with perfect indifference leave the justification which 
decency requires to the diplomatic corps who are ever ready to provide it.37 
Although Kant might refer feudal kingdoms as non-republics, feudal 
kingdoms could also be regarded as a middle type between centralistic state 
and republics. Lords who were bearers of war costs were in the decision-
making process, but they were not the ultimate bearers. The ultimate bearers 
were peasants, which have no say in the decision-making. Therefore, the 
international situation in the Middle Ages was also a middle type: it was not 
as peace as under the UN framework, and it was not as peace as under the 
Rome rule. It was of incessant wars but of few conquests.  
 
Another indicator of Europe’s decentralization is the Christendom. The 
Pope shared substantial political power. The power struggles between the 
Pope and secular kings left power vacuum, which was the important reason 
for that a cluster of strong city-states grew in Northern Italy. 
2.4 Cities in the Latter Middle Ages: 
Citizen’s Rights 
Since the eleventh century, Europe witnessed the revival of commerce and 
the rise of the new towns. New towns as commercial centres were built 
upon written guarantee of bourgeois liberties. Normally the bourgeois 
enjoyed free status: the man who lived in a town unchallenged for a year 
and a day secured complete liberty, exempted from all the typical servile or 
manorial obligations. It was almost universally written in the municipal 
charters that the townsmen should not be tried outside the town. The chief 
mercantile privilege of the bourgeois was his right to sell freely in the town 
market. The bourgeois community enjoyed a peculiar law, by which debts 
could be collected, contracts could be enforced, and property could be 
safeguarded.38  
  
In the core of the bourgeois liberties we found property rights, which was 
crucial in the Roman law, and was not recognized in the manorial system, 
and reappeared in new towns. Moreover, property rights reappeared with a 
new face. In Roman age, the focus of property rights was to own, while in 
the latter Middle Ages, the focus of property rights was to own and to trade. 
To facilitate full exchangeability of properties, which meant all economic 
resources besides land, feudal privileges should not apply in the new town 
market. The new towns were exempted from courts where justice was 
administered according to feudal or manorial custom. Anybody in the towns 
was subject to the law of the towns. ‘Even the king and queen were to pay 
their bills inside two weeks.’39 Subsequently rule of law were established. 
                                                 
37 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, see Baylis and Smith, supra 
note 10, p. 189. 
38 Stephenson and Lyon, supra note 28, pp. 266-281. 
39 Ibid., p.278. 
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The citizen’s rights system, the forerunner of human rights, was therefore 
established. A new kind of economy, commercial economy, evolved from 
the citizen’s rights system. 
 
Commercial economy is different from agricultural economy. First, in the 
commercial economy, resources were not limited to land. It was plural. The 
commercial economy could operate without agrarian land. Second, a free 
market was required to exchange property. The property rights and rule of 
law were the premise of a market mechanism, while social caste and 
political privileges were the inevitable consequences of agricultural 
economy and were unfavourable for the commercial economy. Third, the 
commercial economy depended on full exchangeability of economic 
resources and technology instead of ownership of land and natural 
conditions as in the case of agricultural economy. Fourth, political 
privileges constituted the major obstacle of the commercial economy, which 
prevented some resources from entering into market. Moreover, political 
privilege overrode the law, interrupting rule of law from functioning. Fifth, 
since the category of resources for commercial economy was open, only 
restricted by technology, the practice of the commercial property rights 
would not, like the agricultural property rights, lead to drying up of 
resources. 
 
Even though agricultural economy and commercial economy conflicted on 
the issue of rule of law, commercial economy managed to emerge in 
agriculture regimes. Agricultural economy focused on land. Commercial 
economy could operate without challenging the lords’ privilege on land. 
Therefore, most of the new towns were actually established by feudal 
nobility in order to establish a source of revenue within his own territory.40 
Nevertheless, the further development of commercial economy conflicted 
with the feudal political structure. The inherent conflict was that the 
feudalism society hindered the commercial economy from full access to 
economic resources and a market mechanism. 
 
The commercial economy involved trade and industrial manufacturing, 
which were both sensitive to technological advancement, while the 
productivity of agriculture production, limited by natural conditions, was 
slow to technological advancement. Benefited from the technology 
improvement, such as new transportation methods, new production 
techniques, soon the commercial economy developed overwhelming 
superiority over the agricultural economy.41 It started challenge the old 
order where it emerged. 
 
Year 1204, the fourth Crusade leading by Venice assaulted and captured 
Byzantine capital Constantinople. Venice took 3/8 of the capital and other 
                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 275. 
41 In the early 15th century, the financial income of the Venetian government was roughly 
about the amount the Chinese Ming government received, and the population of Ming 
Dynasty was 500 to 1000 times of the Venetian population. See Ray Huang, Capitalism 
and the Twenty-first Century (Chinese), SDX Joint, 1997, p.84. 
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territories essential to naval control, such as Crete. Byzantine in fact became 
colony of the European powers leading by Venice.42 Venice and Byzantine, 
one tiny and one giant, one strong and one weak, the invasion scene was 
astonishing. Observing from a human rights angle, the liberal states’ 
strength came from respecting human dignity, while the agriculture empire’s 
power came from trespassing human dignity. This is a simple way to 
explain the strength of liberal states which was simply small by size. The 
Venetian invasion of Byzantine made the debut of liberal powers. The scene 
of a ‘mini’ liberal power bullying a giant, clumsy agriculture empire would 
thereafter constantly show. The highest tide was the Sino-Anglo Opium War 
1839-1842 where 4000 British beat the Chinese Empire.43 Once the liberal 
states emerged, the giant agriculture empires were doomed.  
 
The triumph of Venice announced the age of citizen’s rights. Venice became 
a Mediterranean hegemony for a few hundred years.44 As the main sponsor 
of the Renaissance, Venice witnessed the beginning of a sweeping 
liberalism storm which successively hit the Netherlands, Britain, Europe, 
and the rest of the world.45
2.5 Sovereignty: the Formation of the 
European International Community 
2.5.1 Sovereignty and the Westphalia Peace 
In northern Italy, there emerged cluster prosperous city-states besides 
Venice, such as Milan, Florence, Genoa, and Pisa. It was because northern 
Italy was namely Byzantine soil. It was in fact out of reach of feudal 
kingdoms, the Papacy or the Byzantine, and had enough freedom to act. 
Venice was specially blessed. Venice had ‘a great swamp that made it 
virtually immune from military attack; to seaward lines of sandbars 
constituted a naval barrier of even greater strength’.46 The refugees from the 
inland regions chose this spot as shelters. Without challenging the secular or 
papal authority, Venice was free since the beginning, which was not 
changed even after Venice took dominance over the Mediterranean, for that 
Venice mainly stretched in sea and towards the Moslem and the Greek 
world. 
 
However, the commerce development elsewhere in Europe inevitably 
conflicted with the Papacy and the kingship. The commercial economy 
made its way out of them. In the religious aspect, the Protestant Reform 
seriously challenged political influence of the Papacy. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
42 See Frederic C. Lane, Venice, a maritime republic, Johns Hopkins, 1973, pp. 36-43. 
43 The British force was 4000 in the beginning and gradually built up to 10,000 and 
fourteen steamers. See Ray Huang, China: a macro history, M, E, Sharpe, 1997, p. 228. 
44 Lane, supra note 42, p. 43. 
45 By 1600, when Venice was less a nation of seamen than of craftsmen, she reached a high 
peak of influence as a center of artistic creation. See ibid, p. 2. 
46 Stephenson and Lyon, supra note 28, p.284. 
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Dutch Independence brought forth a decisive battle between the commerce 
system and the feudalistic structure. 
 
In the 14th century, the Low Countries economy had updated into a 
commerce fashion. The Lower Countries had some agriculture inland, but 
too little to breed domestic feudalism dominance, but they had to deal with 
interference from outside. The oppression from the Catholic Spanish pushed 
the Low Countries into revolt. The Dutch Revolt had profound influences 
all over Europe, and was directly connected to the Thirty Years’ War. The 
Dutch Revolt and the Thirty Years’ War both fought under the name of 
religion. However, two facts proved that religious belief was only a cover. 
First, Catholic France fought in line with the Protestant states. Second, both 
sides after the war withdrew their religion stand, agreeing to freedom of 
religion. The political and economic tensions were the issue that really 
mattered. The two wars were fought between the commerce Europe and the 
feudal Europe. The feudal Europe lost, just like Byzantine lost to Venice in 
1204.  
 
The war ended up with the Westphalia Peace, the start point of a new 
chapter of human history. In the human rights sense, there were four 
consequences of the Westphalia Peace: freedom of religion, sovereignty, 
independence of the Netherlands and Switzerland, and the breakdown of 
Germany.  
 
The freedom of religion declined the political influence of the Papacy. 
Thereafter the Pope did not have much to do except praying. In the medieval 
period both rulers and ruled were subject to a universal legal order which 
reflected and derived its authority from the law of God. It was the church 
which provided the feudal order with an overarching, organizational and 
moral framework transcending both legal and political boundaries.47 Since 
Westphalia Peace, new political arrangements replaced the role of the 
church, which was sovereignty.  
 
Sovereignty was the premise of national states. As early as 1555, through 
the Treaty of Augsburg German principalities obtained the right to decide 
whether its territory would be Lutheran or Catholic, upon which sovereignty 
was established through the Westphalia Peace. The feudal society had thus 
given way to the Westpahlian state system, that is a system of territorially 
bounded sovereign states, each equipped with its own centralized 
administration and possessing a virtual monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence.48
 
The independence of the Netherlands and Switzerland announced a new 
form of state, the nation state. Within a few hundred years, all nations in the 
world, despite what forms they used to be, transformed into nation states.  
 
                                                 
47 Joseph A. Camilleri, and Jim Falk, The end of sovereignty? Edward Elgar, 1992, p.12. 
48 Ibid., p. 14. 
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Germany was knocked down in hundreds of pieces. When it had 
accomplished its unification in the 19th century and tried to catch up in the 
game of colonization, Germany initiated the two World Wars, which ended 
up with the birth of the UN system, the mechanism extending sovereignty to 
all nations.  
2.5.2 Sovereignty and Rule of Law 
A commerce system relied on commercial property rights, which was 
roughly equal to agricultural property rights plus rule of law. The 
agricultural property rights were inherited from the Roman age. The rule of 
law was, nevertheless, new. In late Mediaeval Europe, the feudalism politics 
constituted a threat to the rule of law from the inside. The Papacy and 
foreign nations post threats from the outside. Sovereignty provided the 
necessary mechanism to clear threats to rule of law from the outside. 
 
The state, for Machiavelli, is an organization of force which ensures security 
of persons and property. Machiavelli had made a great stride towards the 
notion of the ‘omnipotent legislator’. It was left to subsequent theorists, 
notably Bodin and Hobbes, to equate the state with the exercise of supreme 
authority within a given territory or society. Institutions and individuals in 
charge of the state represented the highest power in the land, acting as a 
court of last resort and holding an effective monopoly on the use of force. 
The state was identified with the power to make, administer and enforce 
laws and with the network of institutions necessary for this purpose.49 
Therefore, the principle of non-interference was implied in the notion of 
sovereignty, which was the premise of rule of law. A European international 
community thus took shape. By the conclusion of Westphalia Peace, in most 
states sovereignty only meant sovereign of the king or prince or emperor. 
However, with the situation evolving, popular sovereignty that “the will of 
the people shall be the basis of the authority of government” took over.50 In 
the modern liberal sovereign state, none is above the law. Hence, the 
authority of law triumphed in an international background.  
 
It should be noted that right after the Westphalia Peace, only the 
Netherlands established rule of law nationwide, while most other European 
states were still officially feudal. The nation state was virtually an updated 
form of agriculture and commerce coexistence. As analysed above, 
agricultural economy could be tolerant as long as the arable land was not at 
stake, and commercial economy could operate without arable land, 
therefore, the two economic systems could coexist. Bourgeois liberties used 
to be the form of coexistence. However, a charter offered the liberties, and 
sometimes the feudal lords breached the charter, such as the case when the 
Spanish king repressed the Dutch people. Sometimes the feudal nobility 
won, but when the commercial economy grew to a certain scale, they were 
able to defend themselves, such as the Dutch Revolt indicated. The nation 
                                                 
49 Ibid., p. 16. 
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state served as the updated bourgeois liberties, where international law 
replaced the role of church, and sovereignty replaced the charter issued by 
feudal princes. 
 
The emergence of nation states followed the rule of realpolitik: the 
commercial economy set rules for the feudal regimes as soon as they were 
able to. With the situation evolving, liberal states grew more powerful than 
the feudal states, for instance, the Netherlands soon became a global power. 
However, liberal states did not attack feudal states even though they were 
probably able to conquer them. This made sovereignty also a peace 
mechanism for Europe. 
 
The Venice invasion of Byzantine and the Dutch resistance of Spain had 
proved that the power of a commerce system was asymmetrical to its size. 
There rarely was a case of non-liberal states conquering liberal states, which 
was proved by the Soviet invasion of Finland 1939-1940 where the USSR 
suffered 400,000 casualties to win little reward against a state of 3.7 million 
people. Liberal states were the ones capable of initiating wars against other 
states. However, liberal states were least inclined to wars. Liberal states 
were more politically decentralized than feudal kingdoms since all people 
were equal before the law. All citizens enjoyed property rights. Although 
the political democratization did not occur in the beginning, the decision-
making body was wider represented than in the feudal kingdoms, and the 
representatives were bearer of war costs. Hence, according to Kant’s theory, 
the liberal states were unwilling to initiate a war. If the stronger did not 
initiate a war, nor would the weaker, then peace was made.  
 
Nevertheless, the liberal peace was not equal to eternal peace. The 
philosophy under sovereignty was reason of military action, which left the 
possibility of war. The liberal states were military moderate, but 
commercially aggressive. War itself could be business as long as it brought 
profits. Liberal states do not oppose a war with manageable risk, bearable 
cost and promising profit.  
2.5.3 Sovereignty and Independence 
Under the UN roof, all nations assume self-governing, sovereign equality 
and independence, which make an international order different from all 
precedent ones. However, the picture that all nations are independent under 
the UN is more like an illusion, or at least it depends on the notion of 
‘independent’. In the sense of ‘having their own government’, it is right.51 
In the sense of ‘capable of acting for oneself or on one’s own’, it is not.52 To 
be a sovereign state, a nation shall have a central government. However, 
why a central government makes a nation independent if this nation does 
not need a central administration is disputable.  
 
                                                 
51 Oxford advanced learner’s dictionary, 7th edition, Oxford, 2005. 
52 Collins dictionary of the English language, 2nd edition, Collins, 1986. 
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Sovereignty is ‘a product of particular social and economic conditions’.53 It 
closely relates to the particular history of Europe when the ‘decentralized 
political arrangements characteristic of feudal society’ evolved into 
‘centralized authority in early-modern Europe’.54 Therefore, viewed from a 
distance, Europe reached central government in Roman age but with the fall 
of the Roman Empire it was lost; then it was picked up again in the liberal 
states during the high Middle Ages, now also with civil liberties. However, 
sovereignty does not necessarily mean independence. For most civilizations, 
African and Oceanian tribal communities, the multi-state system of ancient 
China, the Greek city-states, the Egyptian, Persian and Roman empires, 
sovereignty has not been a defining characteristic of political life. In India 
and Africa, the nations had been living a life without central governments 
for centuries, and they organized central governments simply because this is 
the only way they can obtain ‘independence’. If they had been capable of 
acting on their own, they would have lived without a central government. 
Therefore, a central government in an Indian or an African nation is a 
symbol of non-independence. 
  
Besides a central government, all states are also required by international 
law to install rule of law, democracy, civil liberties and so on. For liberal 
states, these elements are inherited from their commercial economy. They 
are acting on their own and are hence independent. For non-liberal states, 
these elements are alien to their economies. By installing these elements 
they are not acting on their own and hence they are not independent. 
Subsequently, for non-liberal states, they are independent only when they 
are capable of not installing these elements, for example the USSR which 
disrespected the sovereign independence of its satellite state, and China 
which has opposed human rights after the Cold War. 
  
It is said that the international order under the UN is no longer realistic 
because equality is assumed for all states. This is not quite true. In the UN 
age, the basic rule of realism, ‘the strong do what they have power to do and 
the weak accept what they have to accept’, still applies. What the weak have 
to accept is, since 1945, ‘independence’. This is conditioned independence. 
If states do not accept the conditions, they do not obtain independence 
unless they can defend themselves. Hence, non-liberal states are generally 
not independent, unless they have the power to choose among the 
international laws, accepting the favourable and disrespect the non-
favourable. China is one of few examples of independent non-liberal state. 
2.5.4 Sovereignty and Human Rights 
Modern conceptions of popular sovereignty and human rights are 
indivisible. For a commerce system, sovereignty guarantees security and 
rule of law maintains order. Both sovereignty and rule of law derives from 
citizen’s rights. The citizen’s rights system requires a rule of law order, and 
                                                 
53 Camillary and Falk, supra note 47, p.12 
54 Ibid., pp. 12-14 
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the authority of law demanded sovereignty. On the other hand, human rights 
are key to maintaining the sovereignty system. The lack of human rights is 
often an underlying reason for any major invasion war. 
 
Rule of law and human rights could also exist in a nation without 
sovereignty, as shown in a colony. Colonies sometimes has rule of law and 
human rights, such as Hong Kong as a British colony. Then what was the 
difference between a liberal colony and a liberal state? Can human rights 
survive without sovereignty? Even though not written in the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant of 
Economical, Social and Cultural Rights, property rights is written in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and regional human rights 
documents, such as the European Convention on Human Rights. Property 
rights is the focus of human rights. Property rights are about the disposal of 
national resources which is upon the law in a rule of law regime. Since the 
colonies do not have legislative power, they could not dispose their national 
resources in their interests. Thus they do not have a complete property 
regime. The people in the colony hence do not enjoy human rights, even 
though there is rule of law and human rights implemented in the land. 
 
Both Covenants state that all people may freely dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources.55
2.6 The Formation of Liberalism 
The sovereignty system provided the environment for rule of law, but rule 
of law did not spread over night. The Netherlands is the first sovereign state 
to establish rule of law. Step by step the conflicts between commercial 
economy and agricultural economy escalated and transformed the feudal 
states into rule of law states.  
 
Venice hardly had any challenge from feudal forces from either inside or 
outside. The Netherlands fought foreign interference to win sovereignty. 
The commerce development in England, however, raised major domestic 
unrest. Unlike Venice or the Netherlands, England was one of the major 
feudal powers of Europe. The feudal organizations in England were heavy. 
The conflicts gave rise to civil war. This was the English Revolution. The 
triumph of rule of law in England, and later in France declared the coming 
of liberalism: the individual liberties replacement of political privileges. 
Liberalism carried out the classic human rights. Thereafter liberalism 
acquired the legitimacy over feudalism. All kingdoms and empires, in 
Europe or not, would soon lose their legitimacy, because England and other 
liberal states dispatched their gunboats to escort their commercial interests 
all over the world. 
                                                 
55 Article 1(2) of International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and article 1(2) of 
International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
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3 From Age of Colonialism to 
Age of Human Rights: 
Citizen’s Rights in a Global 
Stage 
3.1 The Colonization 
The Age of Discovery presented Europe a new world. Those new-
discovered overseas civilizations composed no security threats to Europe. 
An agriculture regime might have left it along, like the Chinese did. During 
1405-1433, the Ming Dynasty of China dispatched a serious of seven naval 
expeditions. Zheng He commanded the grant fleet cruising by India, Persia 
Gulf, Arabia, and East Africa.56 The fleet engaged pirates in the Malacca 
strait, intervened in the local politics of Java and set up one contestant as the 
legitimate, captured the king of Ceylon who has attempted to seize the ships. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese expeditions were diplomatic, not commercial, 
much less piratical or colonizing ventures. They exchanged gifts, enrolled 
tributaries, and brought back geographic information and scientific 
curiosities like giraffes. After 1433, the personnel were dispersed, the ships 
laid waste, the navigation chart burned by the vice-president of the War 
Ministry about 1479, and Chinese overseas commerce was severely 
restricted until 1567.57  
  
While the Imperial China prohibited seafaring at the cost of significant 
commerce interests, the European merchants were on political rise under the 
feudal structure.58 They won the support from the nobility in the Iberian 
Peninsula to launch naval expedition.59 The Portuguese and Spanish 
initiated and led the colonization in the beginning. In this period the 
European colonization did not seem much different from the old-style 
imperial expansion. Spain and Portugal were feudal kingdoms when they 
maintained a colonial empire. Their colonial policies were characterised by 
special interests on overseas land and gold of the feudal nobilities. The 
Spanish and Portuguese transplanted their feudalism social structure into the 
                                                 
56 He's first voyage in 1403 consisted of 317 ships holding a force of 26,800 men, while 
Hernan Cortze landed in Mexico in 1519 with 11 vessels, 100 sailors and 600 soldiers, and 
the Spanish Armada of 1588 would total 132 vessels. See John King Fairbank, China: a 
new history, Belknap Harvard, 1992, pp. 137-138. 
57 About the information of Zheng He voyages, see Huang, supra note 43, pp. 176-177, and 
Fairbank, supra note 56, pp.137-138. 
58 Chinese traders transformed into pirates after 1433, which caused China’s further 
withdrawal from the seacoast, vainly aimed at starving out the pirates. This defensive 
posture included restricting foreign trade by demanding that it all be in the guise of 
tributary trade. See Fairbank, supra note 56, p.139. 
59 See Marc Ferro Colonization: a global history, Routledge 1997, p.7. 
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vast South America.60 However, the colonization in this wave was not like 
the one perceived by today. The European military superiority did not 
totally prevail by then. For instance, the attempts to colonize China had 
been defeated in the first 300 years. 1521, the Portuguese adventurers were 
forcefully expelled from south coast of China. 1662, the Chinese force 
ended the 38 years of Dutch colonial rule of Taiwan. 1689, the Chinese 
army defeated Russia colonizing of Manchuria, forcing Russia into a border 
treaty. Feudal states did not have the necessary hard and soft power to 
conquer the world. Consequently, Spain and Portugal lost their colonial 
empire by the early 19th century. 
  
Then Britain led the second wave of colonization. Unlike Spain, Britain was 
a liberal state by the time. The Industrial Revolution as a natural result of 
liberalization significantly boosted Britain’s strength, which enabled Britain 
to build up a global military superiority. 1842 when the Sino-Anglo Opium 
War concluded might be the summit of the colonial war: China’s military 
machine of millions, probably the strongest defence ever organized before 
the Europeans, was soundly defeated by the tiny British naval force. 
British’s force was unrivalled and hence Britain assumed a colonial empire 
where the sun never set. Moreover, liberalism not only trained Britain’s 
military superiority, but also shaped Britain’s colonial policy, which 
differentiates the Britain Empire from the Mongolian Empire and all other 
empires. All empires have disappeared. The British Empire, on the other 
hand, established an international order which inspired the UN. 
 
The liberalist colonial policies focused on commercial interests. If Britain 
had behaved like an old-style empire then they should have assumed 
themselves as the ruler of China in 1842, which would be a disaster for both 
Chinese and British. On the contrary, Britain had pursed to preserve China’s 
sovereignty and order. It was proved by the facts that Britain supported the 
Qing court to suppress the Taiping Rebellion in the 1860s; supported Japan 
to fight the Japanese-Russian War to banish Russia from Inner Manchuria; 
stood in line with China in the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945. 
  
As a liberal state, Britain’s top interest was trade rather than control. 
Britain’s primary concerns in the colonies were resources and markets. 
Protection of private property and rule of law were required to facilitate 
trade and industry. The aims were achieved through different approached 
depending on the situations in the individual nations. For nations with no 
centralised administration, such as India, a legal system was installed, which 
resulted into the colonial authority. In centralistic states, it was fulfilled 
through extraterritoriality, under which merchants from liberal states were 
exempt from the jurisdiction of local law and thus able to do business under 
their home law. Hence, commercial economy was built up in non-liberal 
states for liberal states. There were not many cases of extraterritoriality 
because no many nations had centralized administration. However, Britain 
                                                 
60 The mediaeval European category of serf had an equivalent in Mexico immediately after 
the Spanish conquest. See Thomas, supra note 14, p. 115. 
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was one of them. Before liberalization, England gave extraterritoriality to 
Italian bankers in the Lombard Street of London.61  
  
The British colonization or extraterritoriality had virtually installed the 
liberalist citizen’s rights system overseas. British did not intend to 
jeopardize foreign nations’ integrity if not necessary. This is a prototype of 
the UN system: a sovereignty system plus universality of human rights. 
Therefore Britain has transformed rather than conquered the world. 
 
The liberal colonial expansion, however, conflicted with the principal of 
sovereignty. Liberal states normally were reluctant to engage in war because 
of war costs and risks. However, war can also be business. The disparity of 
military strength between European and non-European nations was 
significant enough to manage the costs and risks of colonial wars. In order 
to make maximum profit, commercial companies, such as the British East 
India Company, and the Dutch East India Company, dealt with war as 
business.  
3.2 Colonization Effects in Europe 
There was flaw in the European sovereignty system, which resulted into the 
failure of the mechanism. The designers of the mechanism did not envisage 
the great expectation of Europe. By 1648, English revolution just began. 
Feudalism dominated Europe. Colonization had been carried out for more 
than one century under the leadership of Spain and Portugal. However, ‘The 
colonial expansion of the first wave was not distinctive from the previous 
type (colonization by the Turks, the Arabs, even by the Romans), in the 
sense that the economic, military, and technical gap between the colonizers 
and the colonized was narrow and trade was on a very small scale’.62 
Europe did not yet show strategic superiority to other mature civilizations, 
such as the Ottoman Empire or the Chinese Empire.  
 
Shortly after the Westphalia Peace, with the liberalization, Europe suddenly 
galloped ahead of any other civilizations. Military superiority adding up to 
the nautical revolution, European states suddenly faced the issue of dealing 
the relations with the vast non-European nations which were totally under 
the mercy of the European gunboats. In order to install citizen’s rights 
institution overseas to facilitate trade, European states did not recognize the 
sovereignty of the non-European nations, and forcefully inserted their legal 
systems into the non-European states through colonization or 
extraterritoriality. Hence the resources and markets of the colonies were 
manipulated by the mother country, and only by the mother country. 
Therefore merchants, liberalist or not, from outside the mother states did not 
have full access to colony resources and markets, which raised serious 
issues. Resources and markets were key elements of commercial economy. 
                                                 
61 Which was repealed only in the English Civil War during the late Stuart period, see 
Huang, supra note 43, p. 231. 
62 Ferro, supra note 59, p. 17 
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With the progressing of liberal economies, especially after the industrial 
revolutions, they played heavier and heavier weight in the economy. Liberal 
states normally were reluctantly to engage in wars, however, not in the case 
when their core interests were at sake. When the feudalism frustrated the 
full exchangeability of resources, the commerce system responded with a 
series of grand wars and revolutions. The colonialism posted the same crisis 
in a new landscape. Subsequently, it led to colonial wars on distribution of 
colonies among colonial powers. Britain and France roughly kept an order 
for that no other states were able to challenge them. However, when the 
European power map significantly changed with the unification of 
Germany, the escalating of war on contention for colonies brought major 
wars to Europe, smashing the European sovereignty system. The UK and 
France managed to sustain the European international regime against the 
first German impact. However, the British and French hegemony did not 
survive the second German impact. The US and the USSR seized the world 
power after the World War II. They dismantled the colonial system, 
replacing it with the UN system, which established a global mechanism of 
resource exchangeability through the international human rights regime. 
From a long distance, the Dutch Independence and sovereignty are the 
triumph of commercial economy in the European international stage, the 
English Revolution and liberalism are the triumph of commercial economy 
over feudalism, and the two World Wars and the UN are the triumph of 
commercial economy in a global international stage. 
 
The flaw of the Westphalia Peace was that, it did not consider the issue of 
the status of non-European states. Any liberal states enjoyed the rights not to 
be infringed, and the obligations not to infringe. Colonialism started at 
European states trespassing colonies’ independence, ended up with the 
collapse of European sovereignty mechanism. The inherent notion of 
equality of commercial economy not only caused the extermination of 
feudal social caster systems, also caused the dismantling of colonial system, 
and the democratization of the international community. In this sense, the 
UN was the continuity and extending of the Westphalia Peace. 
3.3 Colonization Effects in Colonies 
The colonization effects on the colonies, however, varied depending on the 
situations of respective colonies. Citizen’s rights system was advanced 
social institution, which has the potential to improve the national strength 
and people’s welfare dramatically, but only if a nation was able to 
accommodate the liberalist institutions, which only few non-European 
nations were. The most important conditions included an enforceable legal 
system, which mostly derived from centralism tradition, and political 
decentralization. Japan actually stood as the only instance. In other nations, 
there was either no central regimes, such as in Sub-Sahara Africa and India, 
or not politically decentralized, like China.  
 
In nations which were not centralized, the imposition of a central regime, 
the colonial authority, served principally commercial interests of mother 
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state. It left the local society along as long as the commercial interests were 
not jeopardized. Hence, the colonial authority played little role in 
transforming the local society. In nations with centralism tradition but not 
decentralized, the introduction of citizen’s rights system normally took the 
form of extraterritoriality, thus the influences only went as far as the foreign 
military existence went, such as in the Concessions. On the other hand, the 
compromise of central authority in certain areas crippled the authority of the 
central regime nationwide, raising violent social unrest, such as the Chinese 
revolutions.  
 
Normally the imposition of the citizen’s rights system in non-Western 
nations produced destructive effects. It did not bring property rights and 
liberal freedoms to the local people. Instead, it brought damages to the life 
style of the local people. However, those countries able to transform 
benefited fully from the citizen’s rights system. The outstanding cases 
included Japan and the United States, The liberalization of non-European 
countries rendered consequences. As we know, the power of the liberal 
states was asymmetrical with their size. However, when it came to the 
power among liberal states, size mattered. From Venice, to Holland, then 
England, the hegemony shifted whenever a bigger state liberalized. Britain 
was a big country in Europe, and Britain was a small one comparing to the 
US. Playing by the rule, the United States was going to take over the 
hegemony. 
 
On the other side of the successful stories, there were cases of leap 
backward of people’s liberty. The colonial process was carried out along 
with military conquests, which were met with resistance. Normally 
resistances were completely crushed, such as in North and South America 
where the aboriginals were slaughtered nearly to extinction. There were 
cases that nations survived the colonization. The Emancipation Reform in 
Russia, the Self-Strengthening Movement of China, and the Meiji 
Restoration of Japan all took place in the 1860s. While Japan managed to 
liberalize which helped Japan to safeguard independence, due to the failure 
in liberalization Russia and China had to rely on their old way to survive the 
colonization surge, which was the centralistic mobilization mechanism. Due 
to the fact that the liberal states were overwhelmingly strong, they had to 
drive the mechanism to the maximum, which was totalitarianism, the 
mechanism depriving all people’s liberties in order to mobilize all resources 
for military use. Russia turned into totalitarian regime when attacked by 
Germany in World War I. China turned into totalitarian regime when 
attacked by Japan in World War II. Subsequently, people’s dignity and 
liberty were compromised in the two states. 
 
Totalitarianism repeals both agriculture and commerce property rights. It is 
thus neither agricultural economy nor commercial economy. In a totalitarian 
regime, the central power controlled all resources, serving the military 
enhancement. Totalitarian regime only suits centralistic agriculture 
economies which have a powerful mobilization mechanism. The liberal 
states were far advancer than centralistic regimes, but they were far less 
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mobilized than the centralistic regimes in military mobilization, which left 
room for agriculture nations to stand attacks from liberal states. This was the 
reason Germany were defeated by the USSR in the World War II, and the 
US strategy in Korea Peninsula was frustrated by China in 1950s. 
Totalitarianism was actually the only options left for people seeking 
independence in Russia and China under the overwhelming aggressive 
superiority from Germany and Japan, respectively. Therefore, colonization 
produced a new liberal power, the US, and two anti-liberty powers, the 
USSR and China. The three countries would thereafter redefine the 
international order and define human rights. 
3.4 The United Nations 
The United Nations continued the Westphalia Peace by inheriting the 
sovereignty institution, and rectified the Westphalia Peace’s flaw by 
extending sovereignty to all nations in the world. In the first three decades 
of the UN, the movement of self-determination and decolonization 
dismantled the colonialism and colonial system. This step primarily 
eliminated the monopoly of resources and markets of one nation by another 
nation, creating the basis towards a global resource full exchangeability 
system. However, lacking of property protection and rule of law in non-
liberal states would frustrate such a prospective. Abolishment of 
extraterritoriality and colonial authority in non-liberal nations might mean 
no resources exchangeability instead of full exchangeability. Moreover, 
non-liberal states were inclined to dictatorships, which were sources of wars 
as proved by the two World Wars, and therefore could not be tolerated. 
Citizen’s rights system was the cure for the above-mentioned two problems. 
Hence, even though sovereignty was assumed to all nations, the notion of 
sovereignty changed. Basic liberties were required by international law to 
install into every state, overriding the principal of non-interference. Since 
every liberal state had different set of citizen’s rights, it was a long process 
of negotiation on which rights should be made universal and obligatory to 
all states. The decisions were made in the form of international treaty, such 
as the International Bills of Human Rights. The agreed set of universal 
rights was called human rights, which derived from citizen’s rights of the 
liberal states but were quite different. The most important difference is that 
property rights is the core right of any citizen’s rights system, but it is not 
incorporated into the international human rights regime. 
  
One basic fact of human rights is that, under the appearance of universality, 
non-liberal states are in disadvantageous status. Citizen’s rights system is 
indispensable for commercial economy. However, citizen’s rights system is 
alien to non-commercial economy. Moreover, democratic rights are fatally 
harmful to centralistic agriculture regimes with no complete private property 
structure and liberal freedoms. Democracy in centralistic regimes causes 
malfunction of central authority and compromises the security mechanism. 
Human rights regime required little extra efforts for liberal states because 
they are mostly already in place. However, human rights generally do not 
exist in non-liberal states. Lacking a commercial economy, it is also an 
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impossible mission to implement human rights regime. To implement 
human rights regime to transform the economy is also not practical 
approach. Human rights as an incomplete set of citizen’s rights lacking 
property rights have no hope to accommodate a commercial economy.  
  
Observing colonialism and human rights both as citizen’s rights promotion 
project, we see that human rights obtain universal recognition, but 
colonialism is more successful. In the colonial age, Britain trained several 
commerce economies, such as the US, Hong Kong, Singapore. The 
colonization is efficient way to transplant citizen’s rights in non-liberal 
states, also a non-sustainable and illegitimate way. In the UN age, human 
rights are poorly realized in non-liberal states. This is foreseeable. Without 
basic economic infrastructure, it is not possible to implement human rights. 
The human rights situation in non-liberal states after World War II was not 
encouraging. The promotion of human rights brought about this kind of 
states that could offer democratic election to the people, but could not offer 
security to the people or basic property protection to foreign capitals. On the 
other hand, the concept of human rights itself became controversial. The 
USSR fundamentally opposed the liberalist human rights, and raised their 
set of human rights.  
3.5 The USSR and Human Rights 
Kievan Rus’, the predecessor state of Russia formed in the 9th century, was 
political decentralized like other European kingdoms. However, Tsardom 
rising after the Mongol rule was centralistic. The Oprichnina during Ivan 
IV, the first Tsar, clearly showed this feature.63 Tsardom was challenged 
after the death of Ivan IV, and was restored by Mikhail Romanov in 1613. 
Thereafter Tsardom steadily stayed in the following 300 years. Five years 
later in 1618, the Thirty Years’ War broke out in Europe, which led to the 
era of sovereignty, an era of glory of Europe. The growth of Europe posted a 
grave threat to Russia. Russia launched several major reforms to catch up 
with Europe. None really worked. The power gap between Russia and 
Europe was based on different economy. Tsardom smothered chances of 
economic transformation, which in turn frustrated attempts to liberalize. The 
Emancipation Reform 1861 neither freed the peasant from excessive 
obligations nor reordered their social and economic constraints to a 
significant extend. So were other ambitious reforms. Russia suffered the 
conflicts between the impetus to liberation reforms and its centralism 
tradition. A series military frustration and unfavourable treaty humiliated 
Russia. Then the real crisis came in the World War I. Germany’s half-
hearted attacks had almost destroyed the Russian defence. Facing the real 
risk of being colonized, Russia initiated the highest possible mobilization 
mechanism for an agricultural economy: totalitarianism.  
                                                 
63 The Oprichnina was small but included all economic and military strategic points. It was 
responsible to the Tsar alone. It was administrative system, secret police and tax gatherer. It 
acted illegal, ruthless, and irresponsible. It was inhuman tax gatherer. See Walther 
Kirchner, History of Russia, Barnes & Noble, 1955, p. 42-43   
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The 1941-1945 German-Soviet War proved that totalitarianism had changed 
Russia. The USSR was tough enough to defeat the German attack. 
Totalitarian policies featured depriving any sorts of property rights. The 
USSR created a very unique economy. It probably should not be called 
economy, because distribution and exchange were not involved in the USSR 
production process.  
 
Economic resources were source of welfare. Welfares went to the owner. 
Therefore, a totalitarian regime only serves the welfare of the state, because 
no other entity owns property in a totalitarian state. From the viewpoint of 
property rights and welfare, the USSR regime was the worst human rights 
regime. The reason to maintain such a regime is to safeguard the agricultural 
economy which most people have their living on. Comparing to Tsardom, 
the totalitarian regime was tougher to the peasants in order to gather more 
resources for military programs. This was the reason the USSR became 
tough enough to confront Germany thirty years later. Nazi Germany, as a 
commercial economy, could never mobilize as deep as the USSR did.  
 
Inefficiency is the key feature of the totalitarian production mechanism. In 
the production process, resources are gained through mobilization instead of 
exchange. The purpose of the totalitarian production machine is military 
upgrade instead of profit. Subsequently, the production machines produce 
less than the input. The totalitarian production machine is therefore 
haemorrhage of the state. The USSR finally died of lack of vigour. 
  From human rights point of view, the USSR died of disrespecting human 
dignity. However, before her death, as a victory power, the USSR played a 
major role in the designing process of the international human rights regime. 
The USSR could not agree with the liberalist human rights, but the USSR 
did have interest to replace the colonial system. The negotiation process was 
arduous. First of all, property rights as the most important civil right had to 
be excluded from the two Covenants, because it was too threatening to the 
totalitarian regime. Second, based on the same reason, two distinct 
Covenants rather than one were drafted. While the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights derived from the Western world, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights was 
insisted mainly by the USSR.  
  
The theory of economic, social and culture rights was not produced in the 
USSR though. It was the left-wing thinkers, most notably Karl Marx, in the 
liberal states developed this theory out of the weakness of liberalism. The 
fundamental weakness of liberalism was that, it provided equal rights, but 
produced unequal results. In the 19th century, the social gap in the liberal 
age probably was not wider than the one of the feudal age. The living 
standard of people in liberal age was surely better than that of the feudal 
age. However, social gaps were legitimate according to feudalism, but it was 
illegitimate according to liberalism. Socialism, including Marxism, was 
theories focusing on social justice to challenge liberalism. It was employed 
by the USSR as ideology weapon to defend their human rights weakness. 
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Nevertheless, the USSR and the liberal states had to diametrically oppose to 
each other. Socialism and Liberalism did not. Social justice was a notion of 
liberalism. It was seriously treated in liberal states. Most liberal states 
ratified the International Covenant of Economical, Social and Culture 
Rights. Moreover, the Nordic states were considered model of realizing 
economic, social and cultural rights. Ironically and reasonably, economical, 
social and cultural rights were not decently realised in the USSR.  
  
The USSR was no doubt a disaster of human rights. Nevertheless, in the 
sense of human rights, the USSR was positive than colonies which had 
complete human rights system from the mother state because the USSR 
enjoyed independence. Independence is the highest-rated human rights, even 
superior to property rights, because both agriculture and commercial 
economy need to dispose of the national resources.  
  
After the dismantling of the USSR, the two sets of human rights, civil and 
political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights, formally merged. 
‘All human rights for all’, was the slogan of the 1993 Vienna World 
Conference of human rights. The international promotion of human rights 
within international law context came to a new level. However, despite all 
efforts made by the liberal states, the world’s main development 
phenomenon since 1980s was China, the country openly denouncing 
liberalist human rights. China is one of the five states did not yet ratify the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and the other four were 
Guinea Bissau, Laos, Nauru, and Sao Tome and Principe. 
3.6 China’s Development: Shenzhen, 
Hong Kong, the UK 
In June 1995, two years before the transfer of the sovereignty of Hong Kong 
from the UK to China, Fortune magazine published an article predicting 
that Hong Kong’s prosperity would terminate right after the transfer.64 In 
June 2007, on the 10th anniversary of Hong Kong’s transfer, Fortune issued 
another article acknowledging that Hong Kong was more prosperous than 
before the transfer.65 Fortune recognized they made a wrong judgement. 
This mistake was actually not only Fortune’s. This idea was commonly hold 
by the international community at the time. There was a mass migration 
wave before the transfer. During 1984-1997, one-sixth of the Hong Kong 
population emigrated.66 Based on the fact that Shanghai, one of the biggest 
financial and commercial hubs in East Asia, declined right after the fall to 
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Mao’s army in 1949. Later on, economy of all China’s port cities collapsed 
under Mao’s rule. It was reasonable to be pessimistic on Hong Kong. It was 
therefore surprising for Hong Kong to end up differently. 
 
Hong Kong had an extremely liberal economy, fulfilling most kinds of 
human rights. On the other hand, China had a totalitarian system, barely 
fulfilling any human rights. Putting these two entities into a single 
sovereignty, there was only two possible results according to classic 
sovereignty theory, the PRCnization of Hong Kong, or the Hong 
Kongnization of the PRC. Nevertheless, a third way applied to Hong Kong. 
 
Deng Xiaoping, since back in office in 1978, launched a series of reforms. 
The reforms were conducted in two parts, the rural reform and the urban 
reform. The urban reform focused on transplanting economic model of 
Chinese societies not under PRC rule: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau. The 
three regions were on the similar development level as mainland port cities 
before the PRC rule, but by 1978 the three regions were economically in par 
with developed economies, and mainland China was one of the least 
developed economies. It was therefore convenient to transplant model from 
there due to the same culture, language, and ethnicity background. Four 
spots geologically close to these regions were established Special Economic 
Zones (SEZ), the experimental laboratories for economic reform. Because 
Macau was too small, and Taiwan was separated by the sea, plus technically 
still in a civil war with the PRC, only Shenzhen, the SEZ bordering Hong 
Kong, achieved a major success.  
 
A fishing town with a population of 310,000 in 1979, the year of the SEZ 
establishment, Shenzhen was one of the fastest growing cities in the world. 
GDP per capita of Shenzhen in 2006 is 69450 yuan (9600 USD), the highest 
among big Chinese cities.67 By 2007, 14 million people lived in 
Shenzhen.68 Shenzhen has transformed into an economic powerhouse of 
China and manufacturing base of the world mainly by the capital from Hong 
Kong. Far more importantly, the Shenzhen experience, summed up as 
creating a foreign capital-friendly environment to train commercial 
economy, was applied nationwide. China’s 2487 county level administrative 
units throw in an all-out match of attracting foreign investment. China 
became a major host of foreign direct investment (FDI). From 1978 to 1995, 
‘China has received USD 128.1 billion in FDI. Recent (1997) FDI inflows 
to China account for 40% of such flows to all developing countries 
combined.’69  After 1997, due to the Asian Financial Crisis and China’s 
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accession to WTO, FDI to China surged, reaching USD 72 billion in 2005.70 
China’s GDP increased 58 times from 364.5 billion yuan of 1978 to 21 
trillion yuan of 2006.  
 
In China’s economic transformation process, Hong Kong served as a major 
impetus, less for the huge investment, more for a model provider. Hong 
Kong was not an ideological heresy since the day the Shenzhen SEZ 
established. Instead, it was an admired place, towards which China pursued 
with all her strength. For this reason, China sincerely tries to protect Hong 
Kong’s way of life, not for the view of the western states, but for her own 
sake. 
 
Hong Kong was a British colony for 155 years. The UK had shaped the 
liberalist Hong Kong. The key role Hong Kong playing in the 
transformation of China was ultimately a role of the UK in China. The UK 
was also the primary foreign influence over China since the 1842 Treaty of 
Nanjing.  
 
The British influence over China separated into two phases. 1842-1949 
being the first phase, through colonization of Hong Kong, and 
extraterritoriality in treaty ports, the British established a complete citizen’s 
rights system in Hong Kong and port cities. However, the enormous rural 
inland of China was not touched by this system. During 1949-1978, the 
British influence remained limited to Hong Kong, but mainland China was 
influenced indirectly, as Hong Kong was the only trading channel for China 
with the liberal world during this period. This influence jumped to cover the 
whole of mainland China since 1978. Although unprecedented in the term 
of scope, the degree has greatly decreased in comparison to the first phase. 
There were barely any rights, and a human rights system was not discussed, 
despite the thirty years study-from-Hong Kong movement. 
 
The UK was not the only source of influence of human rights for China. It 
was the liberal world that forcefully drove China into a human rights 
system. In the following part I will discuss the two China: the centralistic 
China 221 BC - 1911 AD and the totalitarian China since 1949. 
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4 China 221 BC – 1842 AD: 
from Centralism to 
Absolutism 
The Qin Dynasty established a centralistic regime in China in 221 BC. 
Although only lasted 15 years, this imperial centralism tradition went all the 
way down to 1911 under the reign of successive dynasties. During this 
period, there were tens of dynasties, among them eight were regarded main 
dynasties: the Qin (221BC-206BC), the Han (206BC-220AD), the Sui (581-
619), the Tang (618-907), the Song (960-1279), the Yuan (1271-1368), the 
Ming (1368-1644), and the Qing (1644-1911). Ray Huang categorize the 
eight dynasties into three empires, the first empire included the Qin and the 
Han from 221BC to 220AD. The second empire was the Sui, the Tang and 
the Song from 581to 1279. The Ming and the Qing, from 1368 to1911, 
composed the third empire. The three empires are not real empires. They are 
only academic usage to depict common characteristics of certain history 
phase.  
4.1 The First Chinese Empire: 
Establishing Centralism 
‘Students have been impressed by the parallel sequences in ancient China 
and in the Graeco-Roman world: an age of philosophers and warring states, 
an age of unification and empire, and an age of disintegration and collapse 
of central power. Thus Confucius and his disciples were roughly 
contemporary with Plato and Aristotle; Alexander the Great preceded the 
First Emperor of the Qin (221 BC) by only a century; and the imperial 
systems of Rome and Han flourished contemporaneously. Similarly, the 
barbarians on the northern frontier grew more dangerous as each of these 
empires declined, and the economic and political disintegration within the 
“universal state,” in Toynbee’s phrase, was market by the spread of foreign 
religious to which the distressed people turned for solace. The entrance of 
the northern nomads into China and the spread of Buddhism in the period 
from the third to the sixth centuries AD were actually contemporary with 
the inroads of the Goths and Vandals and the spread of Christianity in the 
West, the triumph, as Gibbon put it, of “barbarian and religion.”’71
  
Inheriting the political structure from the short-lived Qin, the Han developed 
a mature centralistic regime. This regime, like the Roman Empire, 
safeguarded an agricultural economy of small self-cultivators. Also like the 
Roman Empire, the legal system of the Han protected peasants’ ownership 
over their land, but presented no rule of law. The small self-cultivators were 
the major source of tax and soldier of the state. Politically privileged group 
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owned large estates without paying tax obligations to the state. During the 
process of the expansion of the large estates over the small farms, the tax 
and soldier source of the state dried up.72 Subsequently the Dynasty 
declined, in a similar way as the decline of Roman Empire. 
  
It did not seem that China would went back to unification in the beginning 
of the post-Han era. The gentry class, owners of large estates, abandoned 
hope of reviving the central leadership and returned home to organize self-
defence forces, playing the similar role of the European knights and 
barons.73 The gentry class and the north nomadic people set up numerable 
kingdoms after the Han. Warfare among them was incessant. ‘Large-scale 
engagements and decisive battles, however, did not occur very often’.74 
Gentry influence, which had diffused the rural power during the Later Han 
period, made general mobilization difficult if not altogether impossible. The 
records show that in the period of disunity armies were often made up of 
hired mercenaries’.75 Many kingdoms, rampant wars and Buddhism, the 
foreign religion, spread, the situation was similar to Dark Age Europe. 
  
However, while Europe was advancing their way into feudalism, in China 
the Sui suddenly restored a centralistic dynasty in the 6th century. 
Thereafter, the history of China was by no means resembled the European 
history.  
  
Slavery shall be able to explain this diversification. The Graeco-Roman 
used slave labour extensively.76 However, ’There were few slaves in the 
Chinese empire.’77 Household slaves had existed all the time throughout the 
centralistic history from 221 BC down to 1911, but mass use of slaves in 
economic production was never found. In Later Han, there is little evidence 
of slaves being engaged in agricultural work or of any legal restraints on 
tenant cultivators.78
  
The decline of the central power inevitably disabled the security 
mechanism. Now a farmer planted with no confidence that he would reap. In 
the upheavals of the Dark Ages the crying social need was for protection. A 
farmer’s ‘only course was to barter with a lord, offering what he had in 
return for protection: his labour, his freedom of movement, and the freedom 
                                                 
72 ‘Despite the distress evident in the countryside in the second century and the increasing 
incidence of drifters, starvation, and unrest, agriculture in general does not appear to have 
been depressed. For the large landowner, this period seems to have been one of prosperity.’ 
Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe, The Cambridge history of China, Volume I, The Ch’in 
and Han Empires, 221 BC – AD 220, Cambridge, 1986, p622.  
73 Huang, supra note 43, p. 67 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid, pp. 69-70 
76 80% of Roman families had, in the second century AD, once been emancipated from 
slavery. See Thomas, supra note 14, p.111. 
77 Ibid., p. 114. 
78 Twitchett and Loewe, supra note 72, p. 626 
 39
and labour of his children. He agreed to become, in a word, his lord’s 
hereditary serf.’79  
  
Serfdom was, nevertheless, not rudimentary different from slavery. From 
the legal viewpoint, a serf was freeman and a slave was not. However, from 
the economical viewpoint, they were similar: a serf or a slave, his freedom, 
labour and children were bound to the master’s land in the same way. The 
reason the serfdom replaced of slavery was also economical: slaves worked 
badly in comparison with free men. By the end of the war of expansion, the 
amount of Roman slave owners had already reduced.80  
  
Serfdom provided a security mechanism for the mass in the Middle Age 
Europe, restraining the emergence of another centralistic regime. 
Subsequently, the decentralization nature of the feudal regime gave chance 
to city-states, which brought forth liberalism. 
  
In China, barbarian invasion into the North drove the ethnic Han Chinese 
migrating to the areas of the Yangzi valley further south. This laid the basis 
for a dual development of small regional kingdoms north and south.81 These 
kingdoms were not as centralistic as the Han. Rural communities organized 
self-defence forces and erected fortifications under local gentry leadership.82 
Unlike serfs in the European manors, the peasants of the rural communities 
were not personally bonded to the local gentry. The personal freedom of the 
peasants was never lost to the gentry class. The gentry leadership was also 
not politically and legally perpetualized. Subsequently, significant numbers 
of peasants were not under any protection, Becoming drifters. The drifters 
provided convenient soldier sources for the warring kingdoms. Major battles 
in this age were rarely fought by less than a quarter of a million men. The 
mobile warfare over a large region, which favoured huge bodies of fighting 
men, raided the self-governing units organized by the gentry, thus 
compromising the formation of a decentralization structure.83 With the 
situation evolving, a new centralistic regime, the Northern Wei, emerged.  
  
Northern Wei was one of the kingdoms build by nomadic people in northern 
China. When the Northern Wei conquered the eastern China in 409, they 
made the local gentry into government officials, instructing them to collect 
as much grain as possible for the capital. The Chinese local gentry worked 
in close collaboration with the Chinese officials at court, ‘a fact which 
determined the whole fate of the Northern Wei’.84 This institution of 
juntian, Equalization of Land Utilization, was finalized and promulgated in 
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485. ‘It took the position that all the land belonged to the emperor; 
individuals derived the right to use it at the sovereign’s pleasure. Without 
elaboration, the edict authorized the granting of forty mu of land to every 
male subject over the age of fifteen, and half of that amount to every female. 
Additional allowances were made for draft animals and slave labour within 
the household. All this was to ensure the planting of staple crops, and all 
reverted to the government upon the death or retirement of the grantee. Land 
set aside for hemp, mulberry trees, fruits, and vegetables belonged to a 
different category. It was also rationed to the households according to the 
number of persons in them. But acreages in this latter category could be 
inherited or even transferred under certain restrictions.’85
  
In the fifth century, the north China was devastated by wars. Lands were 
deserted, mass people escaping home. Juntian served as security mechanism 
that promptly connected people and land, and established the government’s 
direct control of land and peasants. Juntian was later copied by the 
succession dynasties and through them passed on to the unified empires of 
the Sui and Tang. Similarly, the Northern Wei taxation and militia system 
was also a prototype for institutions of later dynasties.86 The gentry 
influence was completely cleared. The land was once again distributed 
equally among peasants. All farmers paid tax directly to the emperor, and 
were directly controlled by the central regime. Universal conscription was 
now possible to put into effect. In short, the Northern Wei restored 
centralism, and regained general mobilization capacity.  
  
‘There was a competition for general mobilization. Both the non-Chinese 
nobility, who claimed their hereditary privilege on the strength of their tribal 
affiliation, and the large Chinese household, who built up their local 
influence by extending a protective umbrella over the general population, 
had lost their commanding position and with it their ability to tip the 
balance. The tension between these two groups had been largely responsible 
for China’s disunity over three and a half centuries. When their power 
diminished, the reintroduction of imperial bureaucratic management was not 
far off.’87 The Sui reunified China in 581, opening the Second Empire. 
4.2 The Second Empire: a Centralistic 
regime Reaching for Commercial 
economy 
During the 6th century to the 10th century, Europe was struggling in the Dark 
Ages. In China, on the contrary, the early Tang dynasty in the seventh 
century marked the most splendid and satisfying period of China’s 
centralistic era. The Tang capital at Chang’an became a great international 
metropolis, a focal point of the Eurasian world. Between 600 and 900 no 
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Western capital could compete in size and grandeur.88 Comparing with the 
Second Chinese Empire, Europe seemed hopeless. Nevertheless, the glory 
of China was achieved by going back to centralism. The old style prosperity 
was featured by ‘growth with no development’.89 The agricultural economy, 
as analysed above, had certain cap in increasing productivity. The 
technological advancement benefited agriculture limitedly. Subsequently, 
national wealth and people’s welfare never went over a certain point. On the 
other hand, Europe was arduously exploring new political structure, and 
would soon emerge with new face in China’s sea level, and completely 
change China. 
  
The Second Empire not only restored the centralistic order, also made it 
ever more secure. The Second Empire eliminated the gentry class influence, 
and was therefore immunized from the crisis of local power eclipsing the 
central authority, which had killed the First Empire and the Roman Empire. 
The social structure in the Han was three layers: the emperor on the top, the 
gentry class in the middle, and the peasants in the bottom. The structure of 
the Second Empire was, nevertheless, two layers: the emperor on the top, 
and the peasants in the bottom, likes a ‘submarine sandwich’.90 Decline of 
the gentry class enabled the central power complete dominance of local 
communities, the farthest development of this trend is in the Mao era the 
power of the central regime stretched into individual and family life.91  
  
The Second Empire overcame the structure weakness of the agricultural 
centralism. Nevertheless, it could not dodge the economic weakness of the 
agricultural economy. The productivity of the agriculture was hard to 
improve. As far as the there were no more arable land, there was no more 
room to boost production. On the other hand, the population kept growing, 
especially in peace age. Soon the economy could not support the population, 
and crisis broke out. 
  
The registered population of the Tang increased from some three million 
households in the early seventh century to the 9,619,254 households of the 
mid-eighth century.92 The Tang court could not maintain the juntian at this 
point, simply because the government had no more land to distribute. In 780 
a new tax plan replaced juntian. Thereafter land taxed would be collected 
from the actual owners wherever they were found, instead of the fictitious 
land grantees. The giving up of juntian indicated the fatal institutional flaws 
that could not be fixed: an agriculture peace could not support the 
population growth which was a natural results of peace. A gravely 
destructive rebellion broke up before the replacement. Tang rule was 
nominally restored after eight years rebellion, but never fully revived for the 
rest of her tenure. Peasant drifters were on large-scale uprisings. One of 
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them even occupied the capital. The Tang collapsed only two decades after 
this attack. 
  
Another wave of barbarian invasion followed the decline of the Tang. The 
nomadic people invaded the north China, setting up four dynasties, three of 
which were successive. The ethnic Han people held the South. The ethnic 
Han region was unified under a centralistic dynasty after 53 years disunity: 
the Song. Although also a form of Sino-barbarian north-south confrontation, 
the post-Tang situation was different from the post-Han age. The kingdoms 
in the post-Han era were not centralized, until the rise of the Northern Wei, 
while in the post-Tang era, all regimes were centralized, and the number of 
regimes was far less. The nomadic peoples acquired centralistic 
administrative skills through sinicization. They now possessed an 
agricultural base, and they could take up walled defence. Yet at the same 
time they retained a swiftness of mobilization and a high degree of mobility 
in field manoeuvres, qualities cognate to their pastoral life.93 In the first 
time of the Chinese history there at the same time existed several centralized 
dynasties with equal mobilization capacity. 
  
The Song’s superiority was the complicity of commerce, which the northern 
regime could not learn. The Song chose to rely on it. The founder of the 
Song, Zhao Kuangyin, made no effort to redistribute agricultural land; nor 
did he design a universal conscription program. The Song was the only 
major dynasty in Chinese history to rely on recruited soldiers to fill out 
army ranks. Aware of the fact that military sinew had to be backed up by 
economic strength, Zhao was determined to accumulate two million bolts of 
silk fabrics in his warehouses as financial reserves in dealing with the 
sinicized states on the northern frontier.94 He did accumulate this many silk, 
but he did not achieve military victory. 
  
Achieving a major commerce success, the Song was well ahead of the rest 
of the world in technological invention, material production, political 
philosophy, government, and elite culture. The use of gunpowder, movable 
type, flamethrower, compass navigation, astronomical clock, and bulkheads 
and watertight compartments in shipbuilding emerged with the Song. The 
population approached 50 to 60 million at the height of the Tang. It grew to 
perhaps 100 million in early Song and stood at about 120 million at the end 
of the twelfth century. By 1078 North China was producing annually more 
than 114,000 tons of pig iron (700 years later England would produce only 
half that amount). During the Southern Song (1127-1276), foreign trade 
bulked large in government revenues for almost the only time before the 
nineteenth century.95 Fairbank named the Song China’s ‘greatest age’.96
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On the other hand, Zhao’s strategy did not achieve the military goal. The 
Song’s economic power never converted into military power. A series of 
military defeats pushed up the Song into a major financial and commercial 
reform: Wang Anshi reform launched in 1069. The package of the reform 
programs was referred to as the “New Policies”. One of Wang’s innovations 
was the Green Crop Money, by which the government loaned money to the 
peasants in the planting season. The return of the loan after the autumn 
harvest carried a 20 percent interest, a rate not considered exorbitant by the 
standards of the day. Another program had to do with the commutation of 
service. The Song local government enlisted the service of a number of 
office attendants. Hitherto those positions were unpaid. Wang ordered that a 
new tax be collected to pay for these jobs. Wang made the idle goods sitting 
in government warehouses available to merchants on credit; interest was 
charged when the account was settled. The transportation intendants who 
carried native merchandise to the capital as tax proceeds could dispose of 
the cargo en route to make a profit. To restructure the land taxes, Wang 
planned to conduct a sweeping land survey in which taxable land was to be 
gridded into squares of 5000 feet on each side. For the supply of military 
manpower, Wang decided to revive the militia.97  
  
Wang was aware that state income could be widened without tax increases; 
he apparently understood that the advance of capital could stimulate 
production, and the greater productivity would in turn generate more public 
revenue. This expansionist view differed from the traditional economic 
perspective, which saw everything as a fixed quantity.98 It is a fact that 
China had made the first attempt to institutionalize the monetary 
management of state affairs one thousand years ago. Such a system was first 
possible in the European city-states several centuries later. And it was not 
yet viable in China even by today in 2007. The result of the reform was 
therefore foreseeable. It ended up in futile, and was abolished in 1086. 
Moreover, the failure of the reform also disabled the hope to re-establish the 
link between the superstructure of the state and its infrastructure, which was 
maintained when taxation was in the hands of army personnel in the field in 
the later-Tang and post-Tang period, and vanished with the rise of the 
concentration of power of the Song.99 This disconnection contributed to the 
Song’s military weakness. 
  
The Song remained militarily inferior to the north regimes, but managed to 
survive for three centuries, which the north regimes did not. The nomadic 
people were in harsh competition with each other, and sharpened their 
‘mounted archer’s military prowess’ during the competition.100 In 1125, the 
Jin overthrew the Liao established on 937. The Jin was more powerful that 
they took the north part of the Song together with her capital, emperors and 
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35 million people.101 The Song had to build another capital in Lin’an to the 
south in 1127. In 1234, the Mongols extinguished the Jin. The Mongols 
were more powerful. They completely conquered the Song in 1279, plus 
most of the Eurasia continent. 
  
In the post-Han era, the decentralization trend was reverted partly by a 
nomadic regime. The Song’s state effort to commercialize the country also 
frustrated. A hypothesis question then rises: were it not for the nomadic 
invasion, would the Song be able to transform herself into a commercial 
economy? The answer would be a firm no. It is mainly China’s internal 
weakness rather than external pressure caused the failure. The Song had 
been standing the north regimes for three centuries, and the Mongols for 45 
years. They would have developed a new system they were ever capable to. 
They put all their efforts on this futile ‘New Policies’, which were not 
completely ended by the 1086 abolishment. In 1093 the ‘New Policies’ was 
restored. Then repealed, then restored again. In 1104, an imperial decree 
made Wang the Third Sage, allowing him a place inferior only to Confucius 
and Mencius in the Confucian temple.102 The Song’s indecisiveness on 
‘New Policies’ proved that Song had no means to overcome the empire’s 
structure weaknesses. The truth is probably this, were it not for the nomadic 
people, the Song would not throw herself into a major commercialization 
campaign. Gunpowder was a good example. Chinese had invented 
gunpowder in the 9th century, which have the potential to help the Song to 
conquer the nomadic people. Even though the Song did put it in military 
use, it ended up the most destructive weapon of the enemies for the Song’s 
defence.103 Chinese had the intelligence to develop cool technology, but 
lacked organisational capacity to use the technology. This was the Song’s 
entire problem, also all Song’s successive regimes’. 
 
A commerce system required rule of law, which was never possible under 
the absolute power of the emperor. The decline of the Song proved the 
impotence of the Song, or the attempt to commercialize a country in a 
centralistic state, which later happened repeatedly in Russia and China. The 
Song owned her root to the post-Han history: a regime which had eliminated 
the gentry class had no hope to decentralize and subsequent transformation 
into a commercial economy. 
4.3 The Third Empire: Absolutism 
The Mongols established the Yuan Dynasty, which inherited the structure of 
the Song, and problems as well. The Mongols’ lack of governing skills 
worsened the situation. The Yuan was toppled only 89 years later by a 
peasant uprising led by Zhu Yuanzhang, who established the Ming. The 
Ming began the third Empire: ‘an introverted and non-competitive state’104.  
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The uniqueness of the Ming was decided in her way of emerging. Peasant 
uprisings were a feature of China. The decline of the Qin, the Han, the Sui, 
the Tang, the Yuan, and the Ming all featured with major peasant uprisings. 
However, the peasants never won the power before the Ming. 
Understanding this from experiences of the Roman Empire that, the Roman 
Empire never fell into slave uprising, because salves were not the dominant 
economy. Therefore, the success of Zhu as the first peasant uprising to 
establish a dynasty proved one fact: small self-cultivator had dominated the 
state economy. After the gentry frustration and failure of the state 
commercialization, commerce as a economic department was deprived 
strategic importance from the Chinese society. Small self-cultivator 
agricultural economy was then all left for China. 
 
Zhu was the first to make effective use of the techniques of tax equalization 
and popular mobilization, and to adopt the cause of moral absolutism. The 
Zhu uprising was a ‘consciously extremist, morally revolutionary’ peasant 
movement.105 Zhu’s core proposition was egalitarianism, the ultimate care 
of the peasants. When ascended to the throne, Zhu fulfilled this principal 
nationwide. During 1376 to 1393, Zhu conducted four waves of political 
purges. The victims were high officials, ranking army officers, ordinary 
bureaucrats, government students, local landowners, and clan leaders. 
100,000 persons lost their lives in these purges. State and society after the 
bloody purge appeared unusual even even by Chinese standards. In 1397, 
the Ministry of Revenue reported that there was 14,341 households 
possessed 120 acres of land or more. The entire country was actually packed 
with small self-cultivators. Minimum rates of taxation were assessed. The 
financial and tax design, unlike the Song, avoided commercial tool as much 
as possible. The collection of tax, wherever possible, was in grain and 
textile materials. Besides the basic assessment, peasants were obligated to 
deliver the consignments to designated warehouses and depots, some of 
them in far-off regions. Numerous kinds of service support essential to the 
routine operation of the government, such as stationery, office furniture, and 
building maintenance, were not made organic to the offices themselves, but 
requisitioned from the taxpayers item by item. The empire’s fiscal 
operations were so fragmented as to make them virtually safe from capture. 
Mercantile interests were felt to be inherently in conflict with those of 
society. The state had to refrain from enriching herself because any gain to 
the government, in this naive view, meant a loss to the people. When certain 
sectors showed a tendency to grow through industry or foreign trade, the 
Ming government saw no reason to help them but rather opposed such a 
growth of imbalance which in turn would threaten the empire’s political 
unity. It was better to keep all the provinces on the same level as the more 
backward sectors. This was sharp contrast to the Song, which had attempted 
to use the criteria of the advanced sector of the national economy to 
integrate the empire’s fiscal resources, and only let to disastrous 
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consequences. Foreign trade was heavily restricted, maintaining through the 
tributary relationship and was closely supervised.106  
  
Zhu virtually announced to the nation that China could be content and 
happy without the complications of commerce. When a country of millions 
of square miles was rendered into a compact and homogeneous whole, 
certain administrative controls could substitute for the complex division of 
labour and exchangeability of services and goods that normally would have 
been determined by the works of the national economy. High political 
pressure was required to cut off all commercial departments to keep China a 
large conglomerate of villages. The simplification of social organisation 
structure also made centralization possible. Zhu issued a flood of 
admonitions and regulations to guide his subjects’ conduct. These codes 
constituted a blueprint of the idea social order. Zhu abolished the central 
secretariat and prime ministership so that he as emperor would be the civil 
and military CEO of the realm. So he had to handle 3,391 issues per day by 
himself, which was obviously out of human’s capacity, and led to eunuch 
control of the power. Eventually the court would have 70,000 eunuchs.107 In 
short, in the Ming, ‘anticommercialism and xenophobia won out, and China 
retired from the world scene. ”108  
  
By the end of the Ming, population increased from 80 million to 160 
million.109 Peasants rebelled and captured the capital. The Ming emperor 
hung himself. A Ming general opened the gate for the Manchus. The 
Manchus defeated the rebel force and established the Qing in 1644. The 
Qing had inherited the Ming structure with only minor modification.110 At 
the point of 1800, the population had been in the vicinity of 300 million.111 
Major rebellion was approaching, and the European traders had come for 
centuries. Their invading fleet would soon come too. 
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5 Transplanting a Commercial 
economy in China 
When Sun Yat-sen, ‘the father of modern China’, sought to establish a 
republic, one of his missions was to find a name for it. China has a lot of 
dynasty names, but never had a name for the country. China as a country 
never needed a name, because China was the Celestial Empire. China never 
had the need to describe herself to anyone else. The tributary states, such as 
Japan, Korea, needed a name, but China did not. When the European traders 
went to China, the trade also conducted as a boon granted to tributary states, 
until the British sought to replace tributary relations with treaty relations.112
5.1 The Acceptance of Sovereignty 
In 1793, British sent a diplomatic mission to China, requesting for broader 
trade opportunities, as well as diplomatic representation. Beijing turned it all 
down. In 1816, another British embassy was rudely treated as well and sent 
away.113 Britain had been bothered by the restrictions on trade and lack of 
legal protection of commercial interests. Subsequently, when in 1839 China 
cracked down the opium trade, the primary commercial interests of Britain 
in China, Britain sent gunboats to China.114 British’s gunboats won out the 
Opium War and secured Qing agreement to the Treaty of Nanjing 1842, 
which was the begging of a series of ‘unequal treaties’. As mentioned above, 
Britain did not intend to replace the Chinese government. Except a harbour, 
Hong Kong, they did not raise further land request. Britain regarded the 
defeated China as a sovereign state, from which they seek to secure trade by 
installing liberties. From the human rights viewpoint, among all the unequal 
treaties, the following provisions had far-reaching influences: the cession of 
Hong Kong, the opening of treaty ports, the abolishment of trade 
monopolies, a fixed, moderate tariff, and the extraterritoriality.  
  
Commerce had been suppressed since the Ming. It then revived in port cities. 
More than just revival, commercial economy now enjoyed Western-style 
property rights and rule of law which never existed before, and after hand. 
China had a long history of commerce success, when favourable 
environment suddenly available, a commercial economy soon emerged from 
none to a significant part of the Chinese economy. The rise of the new 
economy then brought substantial impact to China. 
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The commercial economy in treaty ports depended on citizen’s rights like 
property rights maintained by extraterritoriality, which was secured by squat 
gunboats moored off the bund. Therefore, the extent of commercial 
economy matched exactly with the extent of the Western military existence, 
which was the Concessions and the treaty ports as written in the treaties. 
There was a clear line between the rural China and the treaty-port China. 
The vast rural inland under Qing rule was yet not able to yield commercial 
economy. In villages several kilometres away from port cities there saw no 
sign of modern industrial influence.115 The rural China suffered from 
overpopulation and lack of new arable land. The treaty-port China, on the 
other hand, flourished from a modern economy and active foreign trade.  
 
The treaty-port China composed of a tiny part of territory and a relatively 
small population, however, its economy importance soon surpassed the vast 
rural China. The prosperity of the port cities, especially Shanghai, 
demonstrated a different face from the desperation in the rural China. China 
would soon separate into two parts, the treaty-port China, and the rural 
China. China had to choose between the disjointed two. Firstly China chose 
the treaty-port China, replacing the Qing court with a republic. Then the 
treaty-port China lost with the abolishment of extraterritoriality in 1943, 
subsequently China came back to a centralistic regime: the totalitarianism. 
 
However, the issue right after the Treaty of Nanjing was not the port-rural 
disparity. For the Qing court, they encountered the weirdest situation in 
Chinese history. Being overwhelmingly defeated used to mean equally to 
lost power. Therefore, the Chinese ruler would always be the strongest. 
However, the British showed no interest to the throne. They took trade 
privileges and left. Opening trade was not a concern of the Qing court.116 
Nevertheless, being a loser to foreign regime crippled the court’s authority, 
which raised a legitimacy crisis. In the following two decades, the Qing 
court resisted the treaty, pretending the tributary system was still in effect. 
The liberal states were not satisfactory with the trade situation with China. 
They raised new proposal, which was bluntly refused by the new emperor 
who was a hard line xenophobe. This transpired the Anglo-French War 
against China, or the Second Opium War, 1856-1860. In 1860 the Anglo-
French joint force occupied and looted Beijing. 1860 was also the year the 
Taiping Rebellion, the peasant rebellion from 1851 to 1864 which was the 
most threatening one in the Qing era, cracked a Qing Camp of 200,000 
soldiers besieging Nanjing, the rebel capital.  The double crisis led to a coup 
d’etat in Beijing in 1861, which changed the policies of the Qing court: they 
accepted the treaty system, and put more Han Chinese in positions of real 
power in order to defeat the rebels. This more flexible policy began a 
restoration of Qing power.117  
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Even before the signature of the 1860 treaties, the liberal states had 
supported the Qing against the rebellion. On 19th and 20th, British and 
French troops repulsed the rebel’s thrust at Shanghai. Ironically, at the same 
days other British and French forces were storming the Dagu fortress off 
Beijing.118 After the 1860 treaties, the liberal states offered the Qing various 
helps, the decisive one being military arms, which also served as the spark 
for the modernization of China’s armies and military industry.119 On July 
19th, 1864, the government army captured Nanjing, slaughtered its 
inhabitants, and burned the city. In this final cataclysm, some 100,000 are 
said to have perished.120 Considering the Qing had just accepted the 
international law system which had its base on citizen’s rights, the Nanjing 
massacre 1864 was a benchmark of Chinese human rights.121
 
Acting by realpolitik, liberal states wanted to include the Qing court into the 
new formed sovereignty system. The Qing, as the weak, accepted it in the 
hope to preserve her. However, as discussed above, sovereignty is only 
another form of realistic international relations. Therefore it did not protect 
China from foreign encroachment. After a series of land cessions and 
recoveries, the border of the sovereignty China was roughly settled only in 
2004 with the signature of the Sino-Russia border treaty, which finally 
legitimized the Russian occupation of the 150 million square-kilometres 
Outer Manchuria, which Russia took during the Second Opium War 1856-
1860 and have purged all Chinese inhabitants. 
5.2 Empire’s Attemp to Liberalize 
After the Second Opium War, the Sino-Western relation became stable. The 
liberal states were satisfied with the trade situation. The Qing court secured 
domestic order because of the structure and military reform. Then they set 
out to seek to boost military strength to defend the country from the 
foreigners. The Self-Strengthening Movement came forth. It included the 
adoption of international law, the educational modernization, and the 
establishment of arsenal, shipyard, and a modern naval force and so on. This 
Movement lasted for three decades, and was unsuccessful and went 
bankruptcy at the fierce blow from Japan in 1895. 
 
In 1868, several years later than the Self-Strengthening Movement, Meiji 
Restoration took place in Japan, which achieved major success. Japan had 
been a traditional tributary state of China, and was considered offshoot of 
the Confucian culture. However, the political structure of Japan was actually 
different from China. Japan was once centralised under the absolute power 
of the Emperor like China. Then the rise of the local power eclipsed the 
central power. The emperor became the figurehead and the daimyos hold the 
                                                 
118 Twitchett and Fairbank, supra note 112, p. 301. 
119 Ibid., p. 304. 
120 Ibid., p. 309. 
121 The Nanjing Massacre normally refers to the genocidal war crime conducted by 
Japanese army in 1937; the Nanjing massacre 1864 is less known. 
 50
substantive political power, which was the feudalisation process. Benefited 
from the geological isolation, which was believed the reason of the 
frustration of Mongols’ two invasions of Japan, the process was not 
interrupted by foreign invasion.122 At the point Commodore Matthew Perry 
of the U.S. Navy ending Japan’s seclusion with his four warships, Japan was 
a feudal state, the only feudal state outside Europe. A similar social 
background enabled Japan to liberalize and became a great power in a short 
session. Living in a tributary system beneath China for long, long time, 
adding up to the desire for abroad resources and markets, Japan aimed to 
restore the great Chinese tributary system, with Japan as the suzerain. 
  
The Sino-Japanese War 1894-95 ended up with China’s defeat on land and 
sea. This war heavily impacted China. First, the Japanese encroachment of 
China initiated a new wave of encroachment, during which, for instance, 
China lost Inner Manchuria, first to Russians then to Japanese. Second, with 
the ambition to be the new suzerain of East Asia, Japan was especially 
aggressive towards China. While the European liberal powers tended to 
preserve China’s integrity, Japan aimed to colonize China. China could not 
satisfy Japan by granting trade privileges. China had to respond accordingly. 
Third, being defeated by a tributary state is not just the same as defeated by 
a foreign country like Britain, which deeply hurt the legitimacy of the Qing 
court. Fourth, the annihilation of the modernized Beiyang Fleet, the major 
achievement of the Self-Strengthening Movement, announced the 
bankruptcy of the Self-Strengthening Movement, which insisted that the 
Chinese political institution was still superior to the Western one. Political 
reforms were brought up into schedule. 
 
From June 11 to September 21 of 1898, three years after the Sino-Japanese 
War, in 103 days more than 200 rescripts, decrees, and edicts, which 
announced a liberal reform, came down from the throne. This was the 
Hundred Days’ Reform. The Conservatives did not like the reform. They 
staged a coup d’etat and ended the reform. 
 
This event could be regarded as the first conflict between the treaty-port 
China and the rural China. ‘By the 1890s the growth of cities, most of which 
were treaty ports, had brought great material and social changes.’123 The 
reformists, with their leader Kang Youwei from Guangdong, the foremost 
opening border, represented the proposition of the treaty-port China. The 
Conservatives represented the traditional rural China. It seemed the treaty-
port China lost to the rural China very quickly in the first confrontation. The 
coup revived the power of the Conservatives which was restrained since the 
1861 coup. Driven by their xenophobic inclination, the Qing court 
supported the Boxer Rising, which was an anti-foreign peasant movement 
ignited by the aggressive Western missionaries, but in the deep rooted in the 
tension between the West-supported treaty-port China and the rural 
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China.124 The Boxers conducted killing and sabotage against Western 
personnel and property. The Qing supported them by declaring war on all 
the powers. The western states responded with the Eight-Nation Alliance 
invasion of China. The allied force crushed both the Chinese army and the 
Boxers. The Conservatives frustrated like what happened during 1856-1860. 
Then the Conservatives reactivated the reform package which they stamped 
out in 1898. The scope of the reform was even broadened, that even 
Constitution and national and provincial assemblies were planned.125  
  
The reform produced disappointing results. However, the reform had 
profound indications beyond the reform itself: when the Conservatives 
embraced liberal reform, who needed an empire? On October 10, 1911, a 
small revolution organization was exposed. They were forced into an 
unplanned revolution, and it succeeded. The revolutionaries even did not 
have a leader at the scene. A military officer who used to suppress 
revolution activities was abducted to be the leader and became the vice 
president of the Republic of China, which established on January 1, 1912. 
The whole process was almost blood-free. It was hardly a revolution. In fact, 
in 1911 the real revolution did not begin yet. The Qing was killed by its own 
liberal reforms rather than by the revolution. 
5.3 The Republic: Triumph of the Treaty-
port China 
China fell into chaos after the establishment of the Republic. The first 
president attempted to restore the imperialism by proclaiming himself 
emperor, but was overthrown before long. Thereafter China sank into a 
period of warlordism until the establishment of the Nationalist government 
under Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) in 1928. The nature of this 
government was defined by one fact: ‘it derived approximately 85 per cent 
of its tax revenue from the trade and manufacturing sectors of the economy- 
much of which was centred in the Shanghai area,’ till 1937, the year the 
treaty-port China lost to Japanese.126 Modern Shanghai did not exist by 
1842, but by 1928, Shanghai supported a national government almost by her 
own. British made principal contribution to the rise of Shanghai, ‘first of all 
by the Royal Navy which guaranteed the security of Chinese as well as 
foreign property, and then by British merchants, who made money and 
offered their Chinese assistants and counterparts a chance to do the 
same’.127 In fact, Jiang never had actual control over the vast rural inland, 
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which was in the control of warlords. As a national government with no 
control over the agriculture department and not financially reliance on 
taxing peasants, Jiang’s regime was certainly the triumph of the treaty-port 
China.  
 
Jiang’s top challenge was the rural-port disparity. The port economy was 
growing, so was the suffering of the peasants.128 The desperate rural world 
was in rebel under the leadership of Mao Zedong since the very beginning 
of the birth of the Nationalists government. Jiang was playing an 
embarrassing role here. He did not have real control over the rural world, 
which was in the hand of warlords, and he could not play a leading role in 
the port world either, which was dominated by foreign powers. The ultimate 
solution would be penetrating the citizen’s rights system of the port world 
into the rural world. There was no way to know whether Jiang intent to do it 
or not. The Second Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945 came very soon. 
 
Even though he did litter to liberalize China, Jiang managed to bring up a 
modern national Chinese government into the international community.  On 
January 11, 1943, the UK and the US signed treaty with China relinquishing 
extraterritoriality in China, by the time they had lost their interest to 
Japanese. Jiang was even recognised as one of the four world leaders during 
the World War II. Furthermore, China became a permanent member of the 
UN Security Council. 
 
In the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, Jiang appeared unprecedented 
powerful. The war disintegrated the warlords’ power. He now had firm 
control over most of the country, and he had high international reputation. 
With an armed force twice the size of Mao’s and moreover had the 
advantage of American equipment and supplies, it was a ‘remarkable 
achievement’ for Jiang and the Nationalists to lose the civil war. 129  
Fairbank blames both ‘stupidity on the battlefield and incompetence behind 
the lines’,130 which was true, however, the ultimate reason was this: the 
collapse of the citizen’s rights system in the treaty-port China. 
 
During the eight years war, Japan occupied the treaty-port China. The 
extraterritoriality system was thus vanished. Rule of law and private 
property protection were roughly maintained under the Japanese occupation 
authority. By the surrender of Japan in 1945, the treaty-port China for the 
first time since the establishment lost foreign supported rule of law and 
property regime. The right thing for Nationalists government to do was to 
establish a rule of law regime to fill up the vacuum. Unfortunately they did 
the opposite. ‘The takeover of China’s coastal cities from the Japanese was 
characterized mainly by a corrupt seizure of assets without much attempt to 
put them to industrial use… Meanwhile, Nationalists with money made a 
killing by using their overvalued Nationalist currency to buy up Japanese-
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occupation currency at its inequitable conversion rate.’131 The Nationalists 
takeover of the treaty-port China simply meant rule of man, no protection 
for property rights. Subsequently the economy of the treaty-port China 
completely collapsed. Jiang took over the property of treaty-port China, but 
lost the economy of treaty-port China, which was the only economy that he 
had. On the other hand, Mao grew firm control over the Northern China. 
The traumatic blow from Japan helped Mao build up a fundamentalist 
peasant movement. Mao established an efficient mobilization mechanism 
basing in the rural economy, while for Jiang, without an economy, the only 
way to financing the war was to print money. Price rose 85,000 times in six 
months in 1948.132 Consequently, Mao’s poor equipped small force crushed 
Jiang’s formidable army in only three years.  
 
Since the establishment of the treaty-port China, the Chinese history was 
centred on conflicts between the treaty-port China and the rural China. The 
treaty-port China longed for private property protection, and the rural China 
desired egalitarian life. The Boxers Rising had shown the desperate 
weakness of the rural China. The Mao’s movement demonstrated the rural 
China’s iron will to fulfil egalitarianism at any cost. 
5.4 The Totalitarian regime 
Were it not for the other Entente powers, Russia probably had been 
colonized by Germany during the Russian-German War 1914-1917. Were it 
not for the Allied Powers, China would have been colonized by Japan. The 
reason Russia and China both turned into totalitarianism lied in two facts. 
First, Russia and China were both agriculture centralistic state. Second, the 
likeness of Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan, which might be greater 
than the likeness of the USSR and the People’s Republic of China. 
 
The PRC established in 1949. However, Mao’s revolution accomplished 
only on July 27, 1953, the day the Korean Armistice Agreement signed. 
Frustrating the American strategy in Korean Peninsula, the PRC secured 
itself from risk of foreign intervention into China’s independence. 
5.4.1 Fulfilling Egalitarianism 
The Mao’s movement was the second peasant uprising to seize the state 
power after the Zhu’s movement. The propositions of the two movements 
shared two elements: eliminating foreign influence and implementing 
egalitarianism. Zhu eliminated the Mongol influence. For Mao, although 
managed to frustrate the American’s potential intention to interfere China 
through the Korean War, the liberal states, although whose influences were 
eliminated in China, were still overwhelmingly stronger than China. Mao 
did not achieve the same level national security as Zhu did. Therefore, Mao 
implemented egalitarianism more thorough than Zhu did. 
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The top threat to egalitarianism was the merchants in the former treaty-port 
China, whom had been substantively robbed by the Nationalists government, 
but the major task was to redistribute land in the rural China. Both task 
accomplished before 1956. Merchants’ property was nationalized with or 
without compensation. The so-called landlords, who normally only had a 
small piece of land, were deprived of their land, and distributed among 
landless peasants during the land reform. This was the ‘Socialist 
Transformation’. From the legal viewpoint, this ‘Socialist Transformation’ 
had no legal ground and was outright trespass of property rights. Therefore, 
it was accomplished through mass mobilization. The process was marked by 
bloody violence. The nationalization process caused at least 500,000 to 
800,000 executions, and suicide cases of at least the same number.133 The 
land reform involved at least one to two million executions.134 As the result 
of this violent process, commerce organization was eliminated, and 43% of 
rural land was redistributed equally to 60% of the rural population. More 
importantly, under the new land law, peasants had no rights to sell their land. 
Therefore, the peasants did not have property rights over their land. In 
Chinese legal history, peasants own their land in most of the time of the two 
thousand years since the Qin. In other word, Mao reversed the tradition of a 
continuation property rights. Mao’s regime then went further than Zhu’s 
regime. Zhu suppressed the commerce activity, but he still kept the 
agricultural economy. Mao eliminated both commerce organization and 
agricultural property rights. Therefore, Mao’s regime was neither 
commercial economy nor agricultural economy, but a totalitarian regime. 
Mao’s following measures further illuminated this fact. 
 
A totalitarian regime was characterized by absolute public power in 
mobilization so that only state was legitimate to own property. Since 
property served the welfare of the owner, the national resources therefore 
served only the welfare of the state. The state’s welfare was security. Hence 
a complete military industry scheme was deployed as soon as possible. 
Hundreds of State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs) were set up. This industry 
was not a parallel of the industry in liberal states. First, SOEs did not own 
their properties, such as machines, profits. Second, SOEs utilized resources 
for free, and the productions were distributed instead of exchanged. SOEs 
did not function upon a market mechanism. Third, state cadres governed 
SOEs. SOEs were branches of the state executive organ rather than 
commercial companies. Fourth, SOEs were politically motivated, not profit-
oriented. Subsequently, they normally did not make any profit. The output 
usually was smaller than the input. Inefficiency was the nature of SOEs so 
SOEs were not self-sustained. Fifth, SOEs had no help to people’s welfare. 
They ate up national resources but their production did not come to the 
people. The economic statistics might show great growth, but people’s 
living standard did not promote accordingly. Sixth, the huge scale transfer 
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of resources, mainly from agriculture to industry department created an 
urban-rural disparity. Seventh, the disparity caused huge rural migration to 
the cities, which had pushed the urban population up to 130 million by 
1960.135 It in liberal states was a natural part of the process of 
industrialization. However, in Mao era it was a crisis. Lacking a market to 
provide employment and goods and service, the migrants was breaking 
down the urban order. The crisis was met by the systematic shipment of 
many millions of unemployed out of the cities to the countryside. A 
program of complete household registration thereafter effectively stopped 
illegal migration.136  
5.4.2 The Hukou System 
Most of Mao’s policies had vanished. However, hukou, the household 
registration system, remained in the heart of the Chinese political and legal 
structure till today as 2007. The importance of this heritage in today China 
proved that the post-Mao regime was not a revolution, but a continuation of 
Mao’s regime.  
 
The Regulations on Hukou Registration implemented in 1958. It developed 
into a crucial element of virtually all Chinese political, legal, social, and 
culture structures. First, the principal function of the hukou system was to 
separate peasants from townsmen. The mobilization mechanism of 
transferring resources from rural world to the state industry required the 
state coercion to make peasants accept such an arrangement. The hukou 
system therefore proved that China in 2007 was still a mobilization 
mechanism. Second, one’s hukou records his identity and place of live and 
so on. It is nearly impossible to change one’s hukou without consent of the 
state. One needs hukou to establish eligibility for basic needs, such as access 
to food, clothing, shelter, marry, education, employment or land, and 
enlistment. It was then impossible to survive outside the hukou system. 
Therefore, freedom of movement was completely blocked. No labour 
movement existed to worry. In big cities like Shanghai or Guangzhou, 
people without local hukou were even forbidden to enter. Violators were 
subject to arrest.137 In Chinese history, peasants used to escape hometown at 
the time of famine or warfare, and then not anymore, which was partly 
responsible for the huge-scale death of the 1958-1960 famine. Third, there 
were two hukou categories separating people into two groups: peasants and 
townsmen. Townsmen enjoyed welfare differently according to their 
workplaces. Generally, townsmen had access to education, medical care, 
social service, housing, ration coupons, subsidized food, staple goods, 
recreation, lifetime pensions, political life, and so on. Peasants enjoyed none 
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of them. By the 1980s the workers in state industry that provided the 
greatest welfare and two fifths of the work opportunities, would total 27 
million.138 Peasants accounted for 76.29% of the population, or 807.57 
million in 1985.139 Fourth, the hukou system had virtually restored the port-
rural disparity. China was split into two worlds, the urban world and the 
rural world. Policies in the two worlds were different, and sometimes 
contradictory. This disparity was inherited by Deng and served as the 
backbone of post-Mao Chinese regime.  
5.4.3 Further Mobilization: State Slavery 
By the accomplishment of the ‘Socialist Transformation’ campaign in 1956, 
private property and organized commerce were eliminated. However, 
China’s national strength was still far behind liberal powers. Mao proposed 
the scheme of ‘Surpassing the UK, gaining the US within 25 years’. 
According to the scheme, the rural world was reorganized into People’s 
Communes in order to provide more resources to support the state industry.  
 
By the end of 1958, all peasants were living in People’s Communes. The 
Communes collectivized peasants’ land and tools such as hoes, ploughs, 
harrows, farm cattle, and even pan, pot and kitchen knives.140 Peasants work 
under the instructions from the Communes. The Communes owned the 
production, which was the point of the system so that most possible resource 
could be transferred to the state industry. The peasants received rewards for 
his work. Rural markets, which had been in existence for thousands of years, 
were banned.141 Rural trade, which meant selling one’s homegrown hens, 
eggs, or plums, was criminalized. Some scholars call the People’s 
Commune modern serfdom.142 However, this might not be so accurate, 
because serfs owned the production, but the commune members did not. 
Considering that the commune members owned no land, no tools, no 
production, and they were not able to leave the commune, and their children 
inherited their identity tag, they were more similar to slaves, but there was a 
difference: slaves work for private owners, and commune members work for 
the state. They could therefore be recognized as state slaves. 
 
According to the Roman experiences, slavery had low productivity. 
Similarly, the People’s Commune led to drastic crop reduction almost 
instantly. Combining with higher degree of resource extraction, a famine 
broke up during 1958-1960. Some 20 to 30 million people, 143 mainly 
                                                 
138 Fairbank, supra note 56, p. 375 
139 China Statistical Yearbook 2007, National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/, visited on 15 January 2008. 
140 ’These shifts toward more collective activities entailed the wide spread confiscation of 
private agricultural tools and, to a lesser extent, personal household property.’ See, 
MacFarquhar and Fairbank, supra note 133, p.365. 
141 In the second half of 1959, the government sanctioned the reopening of rural markets 
that had been closed in 1958. See Ibid., p. 375. 
142 See Edward Friedman, Paul G. Pickowicz, Mark Selden, and Kay Ann Johnson, Chinese 
village, socialist state, Yale University Press, 1991. 
143 Fairbank, supra note 56, p. 368. 
 57
peasants because townsmen enjoyed food ration, died of malnutrition and 
famine.144 The government blamed the bad weather, which was not likely to 
be true. First, in China’s long history, there was no record of bad weather 
killing so many.145 Second, net exports of grain in 1958, 1959, and 1960 
were 2.66 million, 4.15 million and 2.65 million metric tons respectively.146 
Therefore, the issue was not really food shortage, but lack of access to food. 
The situation of 1958-1960 was that, the last granule of grain was taken 
away from people’s mouth and shipped to foreign country, mainly the 
Soviet Union, leaving people to death.147 From the viewpoint of human 
rights, the People’s Commune system was the abysmal in Chinese history. 
 
After the great famine, peasants were allowed to keep a tiny piece of private 
plot, from which they owned the crop. However, the People’s Commune 
system was only abolished after Mao’s death in 1976. It should be note that 
during Mao’s 27 years rule, although people’s living standard was hardly 
improved, the GDP of 1978 was 5 times of 1950. ‘Growth with no 
development’ was one of the Chinese characters, which would continue 
further into the time of the China economy miracle in the following three 
decades. As we know, the reason is the state was the only legitimate owner, 
so that the welfare of economy growth only benefited the state.  
5.5 The Totalitarianism Revised: State 
Serfdom 
During 1961-1966 Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were in power and tried 
to rectify Mao’s leftist policies, but Mao crushed it with his powerful 
Cultural Revolution 1966-1976. Liu was killed in the Cultural Revolution, 
but Deng managed to come back to office after Mao’s death in 1978, PRC’s 
29th anniversary, by the time the international environment had significantly 
changed. First, the UN accomplished the mission of maintaining world 
peace, and Japan was democratized. China did not face any substantive 
security challenge. Second, the game in the international arena shifted, from 
military competition to development competition. China’s defeated rivalry 
Japan had grown into an economic giant, fulfilling China’s dream of 
‘Surpassing the UK, Gaining the US within twenty-five years’, while 
China’s mobilization mechanism ended up in catastrophes. Japan’s lead in 
the new game pushed China to seek economic power. Third, the 
development of Hong Kong and Taiwan considerably impacted China. 
Hong Kong’s prosperity challenged the legitimacy of the PRC regime. 
                                                 
144 ’First, the famine was disproportionately a rural phenomenon. Second, even within rural 
areas, death were highly concentrated regionally.’ See MacFarquhar and Fairbank, supra 
note 133, p. 372. 
145 Ibid., p.371. 
146 Ibid., p. 381. 
147 On 22 February 1959, Mao issued the order, ‘the problem of Production Concealing and 
Secret Distribution shall be resolved immediately’. This issue was reaffirmed in the 
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Taiwan was technically still in a civil war with China, and upheld an 
ideology of recapturing mainland China. Although not a substantive military 
threat, Taiwan by the end of the 1970s constituted a serious challenge to the 
weak PRC. Deng started his reform in the rural world, which he tried in the 
1960s but was interrupted by Mao. 
5.5.1 The Rural Reform: Household 
Responsibility Sytem 
The top challenge in the rural world was the population growth. From 1949 
to the 1980s the population had doubled to one billion, most of them live in 
the countryside in abject poverty. The PRC had to control the population 
growth if they did not want to repeat the fate of the previous dynasties. 
Thanks to the western medical technology, one-child policy was then 
possible, and it worked. 
 
The household responsibility system was installed to replace the People’s 
Commune system. Land was distributed equally to peasants, again, as well 
as tools and so on. Peasants manage their share of land, owning the 
production, paying agriculture taxes. Ban on markets and commerce 
activities were lift. However, peasants were not allowed to trade their land, 
which means they still do not own the land. The state slavery was ended. 
Nevertheless, due to the fact that peasants does not have personal liberty of 
movement, and they do not own their land, and they passed their identity tag 
to their children, the household responsibility system made a state serfdom. 
Therefore, Deng’s agriculture reform pushed China from state slavery to 
state serfdom. Neither of them was ever found before in the Chinese history. 
  
During 1978-1984, the agriculture output recorded high growth. Agriculture 
accounts 33.4% of GDP at the height in 1984. Huge population shook 
poverty. During 1981-2001, the estimated share of the population living on 
less than USD 1 per day has been slashed from 64% to 16%, lifting over 
400 million people out of absolute poverty.148 ‘But by the late 1980s, when 
China's development strategy directed resources to industry and to the richer 
coastal provinces, poverty reduction began to stall. The allocation of public 
resources to agriculture declined, and the terms of trade turned against the 
sector. Special concessions for taxes and repatriation of profits went to 
foreign investment in the coastal areas while the producer prices for grain, 
important for poorer regions, were kept depressed.’149 The share of 
agriculture in the national GDP by 2006 drop to 11.7%, while the rural 
world still counts for 56.1% of the population.150 The destitute of the rural 
economy was due to institutional obstacles. The lack of property rights in 
the rural world blocked the resources exchangeability, which excluded a 
commercial economy. Furthermore, it was illegal to utilize the land for non-
                                                 
148 UNDP China wins 2006 poverty eradication awards, UNDP, 17 October 2006, 
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149 UNDP poverty report 2000, China country assessment, UNDP, April 2000, 
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agriculture purposes. Therefore investment and technology application in 
the rural world was further frustrated. 
5.5.2 The Urban Reform: Granting Foreign 
Capitals Access to National Resources 
The urban world was the major distinction between Mao’s regime and Zhu’s 
regime. It was not necessary in Zhu age because he had assumed superiority 
over ‘the world’, which was an unaccomplished job for Mao. The urban 
world was therefore designed and established to build up military and 
technology superiority. The urban world was entitled to utilize the national 
resources. The townsmen of the urban world, which were less than 20%151 
of the population in Mao era, were strictly selected and were regarded as 
elites.152 Nevertheless, Mao’s plan of ‘Surpassing the UK, gaining the US’ 
failed.  
  
The reason was the inefficiency of the SOEs, which occupied all available 
resources but outputted miserable productions. The ultimate solution for this 
problem would be liberalization, but it would challenge the political 
centralism, which was essential to keep the order in the rural world. Then 
Deng came up with this: to keep the state monopoly of resources and bring 
up the efficiency. The foreign capitals then served as an alternative to the 
SOEs. Driven by profits, the foreign capitals would come to China with 
certain profit expectation. For China, foreign trade did not conflict with the 
core interests of the Qing court, nor would foreign capitals conflict with the 
totalitarian rule of the PRC. Subsequently, the essence of the urban reform 
was to grant foreign capital access to national resources. 
  
To break the government’s monopoly over resources required only an order. 
It was also easy to secure profits for the foreign capitals because the 
resources were for free such as land and natural resources, or almost free 
such as human resources. However, China lacked property protection, rule 
of law and market mechanism to support the operation of private companies. 
Since liberalization was not feasible, China had to figure out alternatives for 
those crucial elements. Learning from the extraterritoriality history, it 
should be possible. 
5.5.3 Alternative to Property rights 
In the Mao age, there was only one owner. The foreign enterprises created 
the problem of plurality of owners. How to protect the foreign owners’ 
                                                 
151 17.92% of the population was townsmen by 1978, and 43.90% by 2006, see Ibid. 
152 The Constitution of the PRC, art 1, ‘The People's Republic of China is a socialist state 
under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the 
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property without establishing a property regime?153 There are three threats 
to private property: foreign military invasion, state infringement, and private 
trespassing. First, China has solid independence, so no external threats to 
property in China. Second, the totalitarian regime is highly efficient to 
protect state property from private trespassing, which could extent to protect 
properties of foreign capitals. Third, the major threat therefore came from 
the state, which could be overcome by government’s self-control. Even 
though there were cases where the properties of the foreign capital are 
arbitrarily deprived, the PRC government roughly respects property of 
foreign capitals. 
  
Private property was hence restored in the PRC, however, as political 
privilege more than legal right, and Chinese nationals enjoy no equal 
treatments. Chinese nationals have little access to the national resources. For 
instance, foreign financial institutions are expanding in China after the 
WRO accession. In the same time, it is a criminal offence for Chinese 
nationals to engage in financial services without authorization154, which is 
not open for application.155 Moreover, Chinese do not receive full respect 
for their properties. Chinese nationals are more likely to be blackmailed or 
deprived property by the state. An outstanding example is the corporate tax. 
According Chinese law, Chinese enterprises pay 33% corporate tax while 
foreign enterprises pay 15%.156  
5.5.4 Alternative to Market Mechanism 
The operation of a private company centred on exchange of properties. The 
universal exchangeability normally is provided by a market mechanism. 
However, the lack of a property regime made it impossible to build up a full 
market mechanism in China.  
  
The hukou control is loosened to meet the requirement of labour. Peasants 
are allowed to travel freely. They can obtain resident permission to work in 
the cities. Technically they are now workers except that the state does not 
recognize them as workers. They do not enjoy welfares the employees of the 
SOEs enjoy. They have no access to public service in the urban world, for 
instance, no access to medical care and no access to education for the 
children. They are called ‘peasant worker’, which in Chinese is a curse word. 
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According to the CIA, ‘from 100 to 150 million surplus rural workers are 
adrift between the villages and the cities, many subsisting through part-lime, 
low-paying jobs.’157 The SOEs by 2006 employed 64 million.158 The labour 
market is probably the most liberal market. Employers hire and fire people 
at will. They use the labourers with no respect to work hours and work 
conditions. They pay the labourers miserably and they barely have any 
social security. In addition, the labourers have no rights to form trade unions, 
collective bargains, and strikes. Fortunately, they still have two options: 
accept or leave. Things could be worse. 
  
The commodity market also easily formed by giving up price control and 
ban on commerce activities.  
  
The capital market is a difficult issue. Finance, land, natural resources are 
the strongholds of the state monopoly and the core elements of the 
mobilization mechanism. The state is not able to give up the monopoly and 
establish a capital market; otherwise they will lose control of the state. The 
solution is to keep the state monopoly while grand the foreign capital 
limited access. Subsequently, the foreign capitals have full access to capital 
resources, such as land, financing services and natural resources. Chinese 
national normally do not have, or only have marginally access to capitals, 
for instance, the stock exchanges generally do not list Chinese private 
enterprises. Hence the foreign capitals are sharing the monopoly with SOEs. 
It is a fact that the SOEs are not decent competitors. Therefore, foreign 
capitals are the dominator of Chinese resources, which secures profit 
expectation for foreign capitals, and explains the flood of foreign capital 
into China.  
  
The absence of capital market compromises a market mechanism. Moreover, 
the market mechanism is further weakened by lack of full market access. 
The access restriction does not limit to capital markets. It stretches wider, 
such as in the field of transportation, telecommunication, express service, 
energy, power supply, auto manufacturing, and financial services. It is 
actually easy to judge where there is access restriction or not: if there are 
SOEs, there probably exists access restriction.159 The foreign capitals are 
less restricted by the state monopolies. For examples, foreign automakers 
have virtually monopolized Chinese car market, and China nationals are 
virtually prohibited to engage in car industry. 
5.5.5 Alternative to Rule of Law 
Rule of law is the premise for exchangeability and arbitration mechanism 
for a market mechanism. Since the state including the SOEs opposes full 
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exchangeability of resources, rule of law is therefore excluded. 
Subsequently the market mechanism lacks an arbitration mechanism. In the 
Command Economy era, the state was the only owner. Neither exchange nor 
transaction involved. Therefore, an arbitration mechanism was not necessary. 
During 1966-1976, ‘The law was literally abolished and the legal apparatus, 
which was already inert, was completely smashed.’160 In the beginning of 
the Deng era, there were no procuratorates, no lawyers, no law education, 
and barely any laws. Deng streamlined the judiciary; restored legal 
education; set up lawyer profession. Furthermore, Deng launched law-
updating campaign. Following the legal systems of the liberal states, China 
updated the legal system.161 The current Chinese legal system is quite 
advanced. However, Deng restored the legal system only as a legal system 
under the rule of men. Since the judicial system does not enjoy independent 
status, it cannot play a full role of safeguarding property rights and 
supporting exchangeability of resources. It is the political privileges instead 
of the law decide the distribution of resources. However, the legal system 
can still arbitrate certain disputes. Combining with the alternative to 
property rights and the alternative to market mechanism, the private 
enterprises has a possibility to operate in China. It is not an ideal 
environment. It is only a revised totalitarian regime. Nevertheless, it 
guaranteed profits. 
5.6 The Revival of Treaty-port China? 
The Deng regime inherited Mao regime as a military mobilization regime. It 
is by nature totalitarian, even though there is a commercial economy. The 
foreign capitals operating in China under political privileges just like the 
medieval merchants under the bourgeois privileges, and national Chinese 
are excluded from the access list. From certain angel, the Deng regime to 
some extent resembles China when under extraterritoriality. First, 
commercial economy exists in part of China in both instances, the urban 
world in the former instance and the treaty-port China in the latter instance. 
Second, protection of property is applied to only certain people in both 
instances, people in the Concessions in the former instance and foreign 
capitals granted political privilege in the latter instance. Third, in both 
instances, the commercial economy grows overwhelmingly strong over the 
agricultural economy. Fourth, in both instances, the commercial economy 
does not transform the agricultural economy and the centralistic politics. 
Fifth, in both instances, foreign capitals play key role in the boost of 
commercial economy. 
  
However, there is a major difference between the two instances: 
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independence. The treaty-port China was built upon extraterritoriality, 
therefore, serving primarily interests of the foreign powers. The urban world, 
however, serves as the mobilization mechanism of the PRC. This difference 
in turn influenced the human rights situation in the two instances. In the 
treaty-port China, the foreign gunboats maintained a complete citizen’s 
rights system and rule of law. In the urban world, there were no citizen’s 
rights, no rule of law, only some alternatives to guarantee the operation of 
private enterprises. Still, as a matter of fact, the overall human rights 
situation are better today than in the treaty-port China era simply because of 
independence. Also due to this fact, the commercial economy in the treaty-
port China era never goes beyond the line of the Concessions, while it 
penetrates the whole urban world in the Deng age. 
5.7 Challenges brought to the totalitarian 
regime by its reform 
In the PRC, the reform has brought forth a giant urban economy. China’s 
GDP poises to top Germany’s as the world’s third-largest by early 2008.162 
Comparing the impact brought by the economy of the treaty-port China in 
the first half of the 20th century, the urban economy impacts heavier.  
  
First, agriculture is no longer the whole economy, as stated above. On the 
other hand, the commercial economy has grown big, as shown in the 
following table. 
 
Table 1: Output of selected economic departments in 2006 (in billion yuan) 
Gross output of the secondary industry Gross 
domestic 
product 
Gross 
output of the 
primary 
industry 
Gross output 
of state-
owned  
enterprises 
Gross output 
of private 
enterprises* 
Gross output 
of foreign 
investment 
enterprises 
21,087 4,242 9,891 6,740 10,007 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 
*As a general principle, private enterprises refer to only domestic private enterprises. 
Foreign investment enterprises are not categorized into private enterprises. 
 
Agriculture is no longer significant in the economy, and foreign investment 
economy becomes the leading sector.  
  
Second, the transformation of economic growth into people’s welfare is low 
efficient. SOEs and foreign investment enterprises play the leading role in 
the Chinese economy. The welfare of the economic growth mainly goes to 
the state and foreign capitals, which is proved by China’s saving. China’s 
growth has been relatively capital intensive, thus requiring high savings. 
China’s national saving between 1978 and 1995 is 37% of the GDP, very 
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high compared to an international average of 21%. In 2004, the saving rate 
is 47%. Even though saving increases dramatically, examining the structure 
of national saving, the household saving is actually decreasing and the 
enterprise saving is increasing dramatically.163  (Table 2)Total wage bill in 
1978 counts 15.6% of GDP, and fall to 11% in 2006.164 Japan takes three 
decades to recover its war-ravaged economy to reach the wage level of the 
US in the 1980s after 30 years high-speed growth. Also after 30 years high-
speed growth, the wages in China is only 8% of the Japan in 2006.165 In 
2006, Japan’s GDP is USD 5 trillion, twice of China’s USD 2.5 trillion. 
However, China’s government revenue is USD 464 billion, well ahead of 
Japan’s projected revenue of USD 417 billion.166 On the other hand, 
Japanese government took care of the citizens basic needs, while Chinese 
government does not even pay the elementary education (see chapter 6).  
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Graph 1: Saving in China (in per cent of GDP)167
 
Third, the deprivation of Chinese people in turn compromised the economy. 
The domestic market is insignificant comparing to the production power. 
Hence the Chinese economy heavily depends on export. (Table 2) The 
heavy reliance on foreign investment and overseas market make Chinese 
economy very atypical as a major economy. With the growth of China’s 
economic power, the rise of protectionism of the Western countries posts 
shadow on China’s further growth.  
 
Table 2: Share of the Three Components of GDP by Expenditure Approach 
to the Growth of GDP (in per cent) 
 Final Consumption 
Expenditure 
Gross Capital 
Formation 
Net export of Goods and 
Services 
1981 93.4 -4.3 10.9 
1991 65.1 24.3 10.6 
2001 50.0 50.1 -0.1 
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2006 39.2 41.3 19.5 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2007 
  
Fourth, the irresistible attractions of China to foreign capitals are the 
exclusive access to the resources that are not available to Chinese, which 
inevitably lead to misuse of resources by SOEs and the foreign capitals. The 
misuse of natural resources leads to the environment degradation and 
catastrophes. The misuse of human resources leads to huge rich-poor 
disparities: China’s Gini coefficient for income distribution rose from 0.30 
in 1982 to 0.45 in 2002, ranks 90th among 131 countries,168 and social 
unrests: there were 74,000 mass incidents in 2004.169
  
In a word, China enters into a track, which temporarily solves the economic 
crisis, but is generating new crisis of structural un-sustainability and social 
discontentment. 
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6 China in a Human Rights Law 
Perspective 
6.1 The Miscommunication on Human 
Rights 
6.1.1 The Sequence 
Three truths: the human rights regime has evolved into full maturity to play 
a key factor in the maintaining of the world peace; human rights are 
universally recognized and binding to all nations; human rights are not 
universally realized.  
  
The UN initiated the project to universalise human rights with the 
proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 
December 1948.170 As mentioned above, the campaign of realizing human 
rights in the non-liberal world has not ended up well. Although most states 
incorporate human rights in the national law, also many states are resentful 
to human rights. It is not surprising to find that so many states hate human 
rights; regarding human rights as something imposed on them. Therefore, it 
is important to make certain if those states have good reasons or if they are 
just acting irresponsibly.  
  
The American invasion of Iraq 2003 serves as a good example. The 
democratization process in Iraq designed by the US seemly failed. Iraq is 
currently in a human rights crisis when the Iraqis in the first time have real 
elections. The coexistence of democratic elections and a human rights crisis 
has also happened in other states. It seems that democratic elections do not 
necessarily bring forth democracy or human rights. 
  
In fact, all democratic states were liberal beforehand. Liberal freedoms were 
attendant consequences of the modern property regime. The modern 
property regime is wholly dependent on the rule of law. Rule of law is 
diametrically opposed to political privileges and social caste, which are 
essential structures to maintaining order for an agricultural economy. The 
series of events follow a certain sequence: political privileges -> rule of law 
-> property rights -> liberal freedoms -> democracy. In the top of this 
structure, democracy realizes the ultimate political decentralisation based on 
an extremely centralized administration that is essential to the safeguarding 
of human rights. Meanwhile, democracy in liberal states is based on a legal 
system, which enables centralistic governance to maintain necessary order 
and mobilization mechanisms. Therefore, democracy works only in states 
with a centralized administration and capacity to politically decentralize, so 
                                                 
170 Asbjørn Eide, supra note 6, p. 3 
 67
do human rights. It is easy to impose democracy in a state without 
centralized administration, but human rights cannot survive with or without 
democracy installed in such states. In states with centralistic traditions, it is 
more complicated. The decentralization notion of democracy can heavily 
affect the centralistic administration, for instance the chaotic situation in the 
Russian democratization process in the 1990s. However, in a centralistic 
state with decentralization capacity democracy is a great mechanism to build 
up national strength. Therefore, the promotion of human rights is a job of 
sequence. In a hypothesis case, were Britain democratized in the 16th 
century, it probably would not do as great as it is now. Iraq is probably not 
even in the place Britain was in the 16th century. The human rights crisis is 
the consequence of rushed democratization. 
6.1.2 The Procedural State vs. The 
Administrative State 
When the feudal states in Europe evolved into rule of law states, one of the 
major consequences was the nationalization of the army. After the 
liberalization, the police, instead of the army, played the complete role in 
maintaining order. The police was entirely subject to the law. Therefore, in 
liberal states, all social changes or arbitration of property or interests are 
decided through certain procedures in the legislative or judicial process. On 
the other hand, in non-liberal states, the owner of the army decides in all 
issues. The most important issue in non-liberal states is the belonging of the 
army, which is always decided through war. In everyday life of non-liberal 
states, the administrative organs decide disputes over property or interests. 
The legal system and the judiciary, if they exist, are only a part of the 
administrative organs. In this sense, liberal and non-liberal states can be 
named procedural state and administrative states respectively.  
  
In the context of human rights, liberal states are urging non-liberal states to 
act. However, based on the above-mentioned facts, they often fall into the 
trap of miscommunication. For instance, in the law-centred thinking of the 
liberal states, human rights equal law making and enforcing. Hence non-
liberal states have similar legislations despite that they are of different social 
structure and their human rights situation varies. The structural weaknesses 
of non-liberal states are completely overlooked. No wonder the human 
rights legislations in non-liberal states largely remain only on paperwork or 
lip services. 
 
China is going through an economic transformation which inevitably has 
human rights effects because the economic impetus comes from foreign 
capital from the liberal world. However, China has the political power to 
resist pressure from the liberal world. To satisfy the liberal states, China 
cooperates and ratifies most international human rights treaties when it is 
possible. However, it is not the source of China’s human rights progress, as 
illuminated in the implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Culture rights. 
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6.2 Analyzing China’s State Report 
China does not ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, but China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (hereunder referred to as the Covenant) in 2001. China 
submitted the state report (E/1990/5/Add. 59) according to article 16 and 17 
of the Covenant in 2003. There is abundant information in this state report, 
fully expressing conflicts between the Western law-centred thinking and 
China’s transformation thinking. 
   
‘As of 1840, China transformed a great feudal nation into a semi-colonial 
and semi-feudal State.’ (para. 6, on self-determination,) 
 
China’s view of history is very much connected with its understanding of 
human rights. According to the Chinese middle school textbooks, China’s 
history phase is this: pre-221 BC, slavery; 221BC-1840 AD, feudalism; 
1840-1949, semi-colonialism and semi-feudalism; and socialism since 1949. 
This definition is, however, wrong. As discussed above, China never had 
slavery, and China was never a feudal state. Some foreign historians argue 
that the pre-221 BC history is feudalism.171 It is partly true in the sense that 
China was not politically centralised before 221 BC. Nevertheless, the 
concept of feudalism as originated from Europe contains a notion of 
centralised administration under the cover of political decentralization, 
which did not exist in China before 221 BC. Some historian argued the post-
Han age is China’s medieval history, which, as analysed above, is only 
partly true.172 China’s history only has two phases: pre-centralism and 
centralism after 221 BC. Fairbank points out, ‘if all of Chinese history for 
2,000 years after 221 BC has been”feudal,” the term lost meaning or was 
humiliating. “Proletariat” and “feudal” were only two of the key terms of 
Marxism, and they obviously did not fit the Chinese scene without really 
being bent out of shape.’173  
 
Fairbank’s argument refers to the Communist ideology that misuses the 
terms in order to fit China into Marxism. Nevertheless, the Communists are 
not the only ones misusing the terms. This history is taught not only in the 
PRC, also in Hong Kong, Taiwan and in other Asian countries.  
 
With the updating of the educational system since 1905, the year when 
China abolished the Imperial Examination, history was updated according to 
Western theories as a part of China’s plan to modernization. Interpreting 
China’s centralistic history as a parallel of European Middle Age is the first 
step to fully misunderstand the whole social and culture structure of Europe 
and China, including human rights. Under this approach, Europe’s liberal 
                                                 
171 Eberhard, supra note 84, Charpter III Mature Feudalism (c. 1028-500 BC), Charpter IV 
the Dissolution of the feudal system (c. 500-250 BC).  
172 Jacques Gernet, A history of Chinese civilization, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 1982, reprinted 
1997, ‘Part 3, the Middle Ages’. 
173 Fairbank, supra note 56, p. 322. 
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revolutions are interpreted as a parallel of China’s peasant revolutions. The 
values sum up as righteous resistance against cruel rulers. Liberal freedoms 
as the machinery of Europe’s power and the forerunner of human rights are 
completely ignored. 
   
  ‘Since its establishment, the People’s Republic of China has spared no 
effort to institute and perfect a people’s democratic political system that 
safeguards the democratic rights of the people as sovereign.’ (para. 7, on 
self-determination) 
 
China has never been democratized, nor politically decentralized. The PRC 
is the highest tide of China’s political centralization. The claim of 
democracy in the state report is not made because of ignorance like the 
claim of Chinese feudalism is. The claim however, discloses China’s 
attitude towards democracy and human rights. Compared to the Ming that 
regards absolutism as a political orthodox and assumed it to tributary states, 
the PRC government accepts that the international community does not see 
its political structure as legitimate. It is aware of the legitimacy of 
democracy. It is aware of the non-democratic situation in China. It fixes this 
problem by claiming that China is democratic. This is also China’s politics 
towards human rights. 
 
  ‘Article 33 of the Constitution stipulates that “All citizens of the People’s 
Republic of China are equal before the law.”’ (para. 14, on Measures taken 
to guarantee the full realization of rights,) 
 
It is true that the Constitution writes the principal of equality. It is also true 
that the electoral law writes, ‘the number of people represented by each 
rural deputy is four times the number of people represented by each town 
deputy.’174 Nevertheless, the political discrimination does not really bother 
people because people do not vote anyway. Nonetheless, the discriminations 
are not limited to political rights. For instance, in fatal traffic accidents, the 
families of the victims are entitled to death reparation. The amount is twenty 
times the per capita annual income in the victim’s hukou region of the 
previous year.175 Hence, according to the data of 2006, in the case when a 
townsman from Shenzhen and a peasant from Gansu Province were both 
killed in a traffic accident in Gansu, the death reparation for the Shenzhen 
townsmen was 640,180 yuan, for the Guansu peasant it was 42,681 yuan.  
  
Equality is an inalienable notion of liberalism, and diametrically opposes a 
centralistic regime. Realization of equality in centralistic regimes is more 
likely to bring forth chaos instead of justice. Therefore, it is predictable that 
equality cannot be realized whether it is written in the Constitution or not. 
Meanwhile, the constitution itself is not a good idea for non-liberal states 
where the army belongs to a person or group and the judiciary is subject to 
                                                 
174 Electoral law of the National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congress of the 
PRC, article 12, 14, 16. 
175 Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court of Some Issues concerning the Application 
of Law for the Trial of Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury, article 17, 29. 
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the administrative organs. As a matter of fact, none of the European states 
had Constitutions before the 16th century. 
 
China’s fundamental employment policies can be expressed in this way:  
“The worker is autonomous in his choice of employment; employment is 
regulated by market forces; the Government promotes employment.” (para. 
25, on the right to work) 
  “The State develops medical and health services …Citizens of the People’s 
Republic of China have the right to material assistance from the State and 
society when they are old, ill or disabled.  The State develops the social 
insurance, social relief and medical and health services that are required 
for citizens to enjoy this right.” (para. 145, on the right to good health,) 
 
The case of Hepatitis B is a touchstone of the right to work and right to 
good health. 
  
The WHO recognizes China as a high endemic area of Hepatitis B. The 
number of Hepatitis B virus (HBV) carriers is 10% of the population, or 130 
million people.176 The contagiousness of HBV is quite minor, especially for 
adults.177 Moreover, effective vaccine is available.178 However, Chinese 
employers, universities, kindergartens, the army, and so on, routinely refuse 
to accept HBV carriers. In 2003, Zhou Yichao, a 22-year-old college senior 
was rejected due to HBV at his application to a government position. Zhou 
stabbed 2 HR staffs, killing one and seriously wounding another. Zhou was 
then sentenced to death and executed in 2004. This case has a sensational 
effect, as the public generally sympathized with Zhou.179 In October 2003 
Zhang filed a lawsuit to the local government for HBV discrimination. The 
local court found he was not a HBV carrier and the local government’s 
decision has found no ground. However, Zhang did not receive any 
compensation.180 In March 2005, the government of Hunan Province was 
sued for HBV discrimination. The court ruled in favor of the defendant. The 
plaintiff appealed and lost again181. In May 2007 the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security and the Ministry of Health issued the Opinions on 
                                                 
176 Country Cooperation of Strategy at a Glance, 2006, WHO, 
www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/E8BE4438-924F-4193-89F3-
B81822AC408C/0/ccsbrief_en.pdf, visited on 15 January 2008 
177 When not vaccinated, chronic infection of Hepatitis B occurs in: 90% of infants infected 
at birth, 30% of children infected at age 1-5 years, 6% of persons infected after age 5 years. 
See Virus Hepatitis B, fact sheet, 26 July 2007, Centre for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) of the US, www.cdc.gov/ncidod/diseases/hepatitis/b/fact.htm, visited on 15 January 
2008. 
178 The vaccine is 95% effective in preventing chronic infections from developing. See 
Hepatitis B, October 2000, WHO, www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs204/en/, visited 
on 15 January 2008. 
179 China: Killer Inspires Drive Against Hepatitis Bias, Jan. 08 2004, Los Angeles Times, 
www.aegis.com/news/ads/2004/AD040117.html, visited on 30 November 2007 
180 Chinese People’s Republic is unfair to its short people, 21 May 2004, New York Times, 
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE1DA113FF932A15756C0A9629C8B63, 
visited on 15 January 2008. 
181 Hepatitis B Virus Status, China Law and Governance Review, December 2006, 
www.chinareview.info/pages/case.htm, visited on 15 January 2008. 
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Safeguarding HBV Carriers’ Employment Rights. The Opinion states that 
HBV carriers shall not be discriminated, and no Hepatitis B virus serum test 
shall be incorporated into the employment physical examination except for 
special occupations. This is the first legal document prohibiting 
discrimination against HBV carriers. Nevertheless, the new Labour Contract 
Law of June 2007 does not prohibit HBV discrimination. In 2007, HBV 
carriers initiated a series of lawsuits against private companies, including 
Nokia.182
 
In the social resistance against HBV discrimination, the website 
www.hbvhbv.com had played the leading role. This site arranged legal aid 
for most HBV discrimination lawsuits, and gathered evidences of 
discrimination by foreign investment enterprises. In November 2007, the 
site was shut down.  
 
Currently there is no cure for Hepatitis B. However, many countries have 
prevented this disease by vaccinating newborn infants. In China, Hepatitis B 
vaccine was first recommended for routine immunization in 1992, but 
parents were required to pay for both the vaccine and the service.183 The 
cost for vaccine was USD 0.60 per dose.184 In 2002, Hepatitis B vaccine 
was fully integrated into the EPI (Expanded Programme on Immunization) 
and parents were required to pay a reduced service fee (approximately US$ 
1).185 , WHO in May 2004 estimated that there are around 4 million infants 
not receiving full Hepatitis B immunization every year in China, which was 
70% of the overall cases of the Western Pacific Region.186
 
Lack of health care is not restricted only to Hepatitis B vaccination. The 
government budgetary expenditure on public health in 2005 is 155.25 
billion yuan, 4.9% of the government revenue, a fall from 6% of 1995.187 
Meanwhile, during 1979-2004, the average total health expenditure per 
person increased nearly 8-fold, from USD 9 to USD 70. Total health 
expenditure grew at an average annual real rate of 11%- adding on average 
0.2 percentage points annually to the share of total health spending in GDP. 
Total health expenditure grows to 4.7% of GDP in 2005, and 61% of total 
health care cost were paid out of pocket. The rate of out-of-pocket payment 
is as high as 90% in poor rural areas in 2004.188 By 2003, some 80% of the 
                                                 
182 Nokia China in lawsuit over Hepatitis B carrier, Financial Times, March 13 2007, 
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/91c54ca8-d182-11db-b921-000b5df10621.html, visited on 15 January 
2008. 
183 Hepatitis B working group (3rd meeting – 6-7 March 2007)- Meeting Report, 
2007,WHO, p. 7, www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/CD4CC3F7-F3C2-4E8F-9A44-
165234464745/0/MTGRPT_HepBExpert3.pdf, visited on 15 January 2008. 
184 Hepatitis B in the Western Pacific Region, 2004,WHO, p.3 
www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/B7B3CAFF-EE7D-4FD7-B51B-
79E2367F714D/0/HepB_WPRNextSteps.pdf, visited 15 December 2007. 
185 WHO, supra note 183. 
186 WHO, supra note 184, p. 5. 
187 China Statistical Yearbook 2002, China Statistical Yearbook 2007, National Statistics 
Bureau of China, www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/, visited on 15 January 2008. 
188 China statistical yearbook 2007, supra note 139; China, national expenditure on health, 
14 September 2007, WHO, www.who.int/entity/nha/country/CHN.pdf; China, health, 
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rural population and nearly one half of the urban population were not 
covered by any health insurance schemes. During 1993-2003, coverage of 
social health insurance declined with the coverage rate for the bottom 
quintile income group dropping from 37% to 12%. As a result, half of those 
surveyed refused outpatient services when sick, and 30% of those who were 
referred to hospitals refused inpatient care. Outpatient non-use also 
increased substantially from 36% to 49% in 1993 and 2003, respectively.189
 
‘At the same time, as foreign investment is encouraged, so is the 
development of collective, private and self-employment ventures’ (para. 24, 
on the right to work) 
‘Foreign investment companies will be gradually extended the same 
conditions of treatment as national ones, as unified, standardized and 
transparent investment policies are formulated.’ (para. 39, on the right to 
work,) 
 
From January to September 2007, the top ten sources of foreign capital 
invested USD 40.955 billion in China. Among them, only 25% or USD ten 
billion comes from South Korea, Japan, Singapore, the US and Taiwan, and 
75% comes from offshore financial center like Hong Kong and British 
Virgin Islands. (Table 3)  
 
It is entertaining to find that the British Virgin Islands is the second biggest 
investor in China. The reason is that a significant portion of the ‘foreign 
investment’ actually comes from Chinese nationals. Chinese nationals use 
the offshore financial center to transform their domestic capital into foreign 
capital to enjoy generous privileges entitled only to foreign capitals. On 24 
April 2006, the Ministry of Commerce, the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and 
the China Customs jointly issued an order to investigate and eliminate this 
sort of ‘foreign’ capital.190
 
Table 3: The top ten sources of foreign direct investment in China January- 
September 2007 (in million USD) 
Hong 
Kong 
British 
Virgin 
Islands 
South 
Korea 
Japan Singap
ore 
US Cayman 
Islands 
Samoa Taiwan Mauritius 
15,915 11,197 2,703 2,493 1,939 1,797 1,651 1,310 1,144 806 
Source: Ministry of Commerce of the PRC 
 
Foreign investment companies probably will not be happy if they are 
extended the same condition of treatment as national ones, just like when 
the new Corporate Income Tax Law that imposed a unified tax for all 
enterprises entered into force on 1 January 2008, the foreign investment 
companies have to pay more. The real issue, on the contrary, is to bring the 
                                                                                                                            
poverty and economic development, December 2005, WHO, 
www.who.int/entity/macrohealth/action/CMH_China.pdf, visited on 15 January 2008. 
189 WHO, China, health, poverty and economic development, supra note 188. 
190 Enforcement Opinions on Several Law Application Issues about Examining and 
Approving, Registration, and Managing Foreign Investment Companies 
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national companies the same condition of treatment as the foreign ones. 
 
  ‘All citizens have an equal right to education in accordance with the law, 
without regard to their nationality, ethnicity, gender, occupation, financial 
situation or religious beliefs.’ (para. 210, on the right to education) 
  ‘The State shall exempt students receiving compulsory education from 
paying fees.’ (Para. 211, on the right to education) 
 
Children probably have right to education without regard to their nationality, 
ethnicity, gender, occupation, financial situation or religious beliefs, 
however, not without regard to HBV status. In September 2006, the 
municipal education authority of Urumqi expelled 19 new junior middle 
school students because they were tested Hepatitis B positive.191
 
‘Compulsory’ education in Chinese has two fold of meanings: obligatory 
education and free education. However, substantive fees were charged for 
the nine-year compulsory education. Hence, Chinese call the compulsory 
education ‘paid free education’. According to the National Report on 
Education for All in China released in 2006, China shall fulfil ‘free’ 
compulsory education by 2015, even though the government revenue of 
China surpassed that of Japan already in 2005. 
6.3 Analyzing the Commettee’s 
Concluding Observations192  
  ‘The Committee encourages the State party to take urgent measures to stop 
the spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, including 
through sex education in schools and awareness-raising campaigns to 
eliminate discrimination against HIV-positive persons.’ (para. 60) 
 
Once someone asked me why I had never talked about HIV/AIDS in China. 
I asked back, ‘have you ever talked about HBV?’ ‘No.’ ‘that’s right, you do 
not talk about HBV, neither do I talk about HIV/AIDS.’ The point is that, in 
China, there are 800,000 cases of HIV/AIDS, and 130 million HBV carriers. 
It is, of course, very important to take care of the marginalized people. 
However, their issue probably do not enjoy priority if the majority is in 
struggle. For the 130 million HBV carriers, the only way to participate in 
social life is to cheat. The hospitals deploy heavy anti-cheating mechanisms 
when the applicants for civil servants recruitment are under physical 
examinations. Everyday people are kicked out their workplaces and 
universities because of HBV. Cases of suicide or homicide inspired by 
HBV-related frustrations happen from time to time.  
                                                 
191 Seven of them sued the authority but were soon forced to withdraw their lawsuits. 
Xinjiang hepatitis students fight school ban, 20 November 2006, Radio Free Asia, 
www.rfa.org/english/uyghur/2006/11/20/xinjiang_hepatitis, visited on 15 January 2008. 
192 Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under articles 16 and 17 of the 
Covenant: Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: People’s Republic of China (including Hong Kong and Macao), E/C.12/ADD.107. 
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The Concluding Observations mentions HIV/AIDS five times while HBV is 
not mentioned. This is understandable because the Western World is in a 
different situation, and HBV as a grave problem is never heard of. It is, 
however, sad to notice that China took considerable propaganda, legislative, 
medical and financial moves on the HIV/AIDS issue to respond to the 
Western urge, while it shut down www.hbvhbv.com, the only organization 
which was willing to offer some help to HBV carriers.  
 
The liberal world is structurally different from non-liberal states. The 
concerns of the liberal world do not necessarily have the same application in 
non-liberal states. However, non-liberal states often have to spend resources 
on the Western concerns, which could be luxuries. 
 
‘The Committee calls upon the State party to implement its decision to 
dismantle the hukou system of national household registration and to ensure 
that in any system that replaces it, internal migrants will be able to enjoy 
the same work, social security, housing, health and education benefits 
enjoyed by those in the urban areas.’ (para. 46) 
 
Hukou is the backbone of all Chinese political and social structures. It gives 
rise to a lot of problems. The issue of internal migration is probably only a 
minor one. The principle issue about hukou is the ownership with land. 
There is no point if the hukou system is dismantled at the cost of peasants’ 
land. Unfortunately, this is what is happening now. Few big cities, such as 
Shenzhen, have registered all peasants in the suburb as townsmen in 2004. 
One of the consequences was that peasants lost their land. According to 
China’s land regime, peasants have right to keep a piece of land for 
cultivating and a piece of land for housing. Townsmen do not have right to 
keep any land. Subsequently, while the cities are expanding swiftly, large 
amounts of cultivating land is requisitioned, and normally the cultivators are 
paid substantive compensation. However, if the cultivators are registered as 
townsmen, they suddenly lose their land. Therefore, the municipal 
government of Shenzhen in 2004 suddenly came to own all the suburb land 
after the hukou reform. Since the incomes from land selling become much 
more important for the local governments, big cities are zealous on 
reforming the hukou system of their suburbs. Meanwhile, the hukou reform 
in the rural world is not so well engaged. 
 
Besides land interests, hukou is also related to the right to housing. Under 
the current regime, peasants are entitled an allotment to build their own 
house, while townsmen have to buy their residence. If a person lost his rural 
hukou, subsequently he lost his allotment and has to buy his residence. In 
October 2007, the residence price in Beijing is 14,411 yuan per square 
meter,193 while the annual income of Beijing peasant in 2006 is 19,147 yuan. 
It is therefore impossible for peasants to buy residences. Considering that 
                                                 
193 Residence transction price in October 2007 in 36 cities, National Development and 
Reform Bureau, www.sdpc.gov.cn/jgjc/jmxf/t20071122_173898.htm, visited on 15 January 
2008. 
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the annual income of Beijing townsmen is 39,684 yuan, it is also very 
difficult for Beijing townsmen to buy a residence.194 China’s real estate 
market is in a major bubble. The reason is the local governments’ monopoly 
of land and their financial reliance on land revenue.195 Under this situation, 
registering peasants as townsmen equals to deprive peasants’ right to 
housing in their hometown. 
 
  ‘The Committee, while recognizing the sizeable population in the vast 
expanse of the territory of the State party, notes that there are no significant 
factors and difficulties impeding its capacity to effectively implement the 
Covenant.’ (para. 11) 
 
From the viewpoint of the positive correlation among human rights, 
development and economic growth, China’s astonishing economic growth 
ought to provide people better human rights. The Government’s solid 
financial power, which is predicted to grow 30% from 3.88 trillion yuan in 
2006 to 5 trillion yuan in 2007, shall result in better public services.196 
However, what if the correlation among human rights, development and 
economic growth in China is not positive? 
 
One basic fact about China’s economy is its nature of totalitarianism. The 
cost of the mobilization mechanism is property rights. The state monopoly 
of national resources is, paradoxically, the reason for China’s economic 
success. Foreign capitals can therefore utilize China’s national resources 
without regard to Chinese nationals’ rights and benefits. Hence, the Chinese 
economy is a great game where Chinese nationals are not allowed to play. 
The introduction of foreign capitals is decided case by case, so that the 
impact for the SOEs is manageable. If Chinese nationals were allowed to 
play, the SOEs would not survive. The gravest problem of the SOEs is not 
inefficiency. It is that, in order to maintain them on the market in spite of 
their inefficiency, competitors must be expelled from the market. Since the 
Chinese economy does not grow from a human rights base, it cannot result 
in a good human rights situation. 
 
China always has always had structural difficulties to transform national 
wealth into people’s freedom and dignity. This situation was most prevalent 
in the Song, when China was economically overwhelmingly powerful but 
finally conquered by barbarian people. 
 
If human rights shall be applied to Chinese people, the mobilization 
mechanism will be replaced with a property regime. In this case, the foreign 
capital-dominated economy will be outdated by the national economy. The 
                                                 
194 China statistical yearbook 2007, supra note 139. 
195 Land selling incomes count for 40% to 60% of the local government’s revenue. See Difa 
daxing tumu, zhongyang nanshang jianan, 21 September 2006, The Wall Street Journal, 
chinese.wsj.com/gb/20060921/chw182432.asp?source=NewSearch, visited on 15 January 
2008. 
196 China 2007 fiscal revenue projected at 5 trillion yuan, 26 November 2007, China Daily, 
www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2007-11/26/content_6279857.htm, visited on 15 January 
2008. 
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Chinese government will lose SOEs, hence loses control over resources, and 
will then lose political control. This has to happen after the establishment of 
a property regime. Otherwise China shall fall into chaotic struggles, just as 
illuminated in the case of the transition of Russia. It sounds impossible to 
implement a modern property regime in a totalitarian regime. However, 
China’s experience provides an approach: when foreign capitals transform 
the economy, it becomes possible and imperative. 
6.4 The Abolishment of the Agriculture 
Tax 
Since January 1, 2006, the agriculture tax was abolished. The agriculture tax 
has been the major financial source for Chinese regimes, except the 
Nationalist Government, since forever. The Abolishment is one of the most 
important events in Chinese history. Considering that the Nationalist 
Government did not have a significant agriculture tax income only because 
it did not have real control over the rural area, it is the first time in Chinese 
history that the government does not rely on incomes from the agriculture.  
 
After the abolishment of the PRC regime is stranger than ever. The PRC is 
not an agricultural economy because the peasants do not own their land. It is 
not a commercial economy because of lack of property regime and rule of 
law. It is not a totalitarian regime because the government does not rely on 
the agricultural economy: as discussed above, totalitarianism is a form of 
agriculture centralism. When the foreign-leading commercial economy has 
absorbed half of the population, and the significance of agriculture in 
economy and public finance has diminished, there is no way the totalitarian 
regime can stay. The same thing happened to the Roman Empire when free 
farmers disappeared. Therefore, crucial change has already occurred in 
China. 
6.5 The Special Zones on Rural 
Development 
On June 9, 2007, Chongqing and Chengdu were announced Special Zones 
on rural development. The mission of the two Special Zones is to explore a 
way for rural development. The two cities are authorized to modify the 
Household Responsibility System. Therefore, there is a possibility that the 
two cities would develop some sort of land property rights, and 
subsequently liberalize the rural world. According to the Shenzhen 
experience, which started the Chinese foreign-leading economic story, the 
Chinese government is able to bring a successful model to the whole 
country. These two Special Zones are China’s chance to realise human 
rights. 
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7 Conclusion 
In our planet, lives adapt to the environment through evolution, so that 
human beings have two hands and ten fingers. This process has been lasting 
for billions of years, and as a result the life circle is extremely diversified. 
However, in the last several thousands of years, human beings have changed 
this pattern. Humans adapt to the environment through technology. 
Technologies help humans free themselves from threats from natural forces. 
Nevertheless, humans then need to adapt to the technological advancement 
they brought about themselves. First the technological advancement brought 
the agricultural economy into shape. Great civilizations were built up to 
meet the needs of agricultural life. The most outstanding ones were the 
centralistic empires, which built up central administrations.  
 
Restricted by the growth circle, the growth of the agricultural economy’s 
productivity was capped. The centralistic regime of Rome was broken down 
into decentralized feudal kingdoms due to this reason. The new commercial 
economy, which fully could benefit from technological advancement, 
developed. In order to support the commercial economy, feudal regimes 
were reorganized into liberal states with centralized administration upon the 
base of civil liberties.  
 
In the first millennium, the world was mainly agricultural or pre-agricultural. 
The second millennium witnessed the triumph of commercial economy and 
liberalism. The commercial economy displayed its overwhelming 
superiority over the agricultural economy. Year 1204 when Venice invaded 
Byzantine is the starting point of an age of commercial economy. By the 
end of the second millennium, human rights developed into a minimum set 
of liberties and rights to apply to all nations including non-liberal nations. 
At the beginning of the third millennium as we are now, human rights have 
assumed their universal legitimacy. However, despite their legitimacy, 
human rights are less successful in transforming non-liberal nations. Except 
Japan and the Asian Tigers, human rights are not generally fully realized in 
non-Western nations. Moreover, Russia and China transformed into anti-
human rights powers.  
 
As a matter of fact, most of the states in the world are not liberal, 
implementing human rights poorly. All member states of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, the group gathering most 
liberal states, have a population of 1.17 billion in total, less than the 
population of China. On the other hand, non-liberal states learn technologies 
quicker than human rights. Without restraints of human rights, certain 
technologies in non-liberal states created catastrophic consequences with 
global reach. This is exemplified by the environmental crisis. For instance, 
without electric saws and trucks, local people probably are not able to 
deforest the rainforests so efficiently, while these technologies would not 
create such a problem in the home country due to the environmental law.  
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In the beginning of the third millennium, the international community’s top 
priority is human rights promotion, especially in non-liberal states. China’s 
move is significant in this human rights project. First, China as one of the 
few non-liberal states presenting extraordinary economic growth shows 
potentials of liberalization. Economic growth alone is not enough for 
liberalization. However, economic growth is indispensable for liberalization. 
Second, the liberal world would instantly double its size if China manages 
to liberalize. The map of world human rights would radically change. Third, 
more importantly, China has the potential to offer a different model of 
liberalization for non-liberal states. China is an independent country so that 
China can act on its own. This means it is able to resist inappropriate 
measures recommended by the international community, for instance, 
democracy. Democracy is a mechanism combining extreme political 
decentralization and a centralised administration. It requires a very high 
threshold. As in the case of Europe, it is built up upon the legal system 
inherited from the Roman age and civil liberties, especially property rights 
achieved in the liberal revolutions. Universal suffrage were not available in 
all European states in the ninetieth century, which shows democracy is not a 
key element in liberalization simply because many European states were 
already liberal by ninetieth century. Democracy installed in states with no 
central administration, such as some African states, does not function. 
Democracy in centralised states with no property regime, even worse, 
causes catastrophic consequences, as illuminated in the Russia case. The 
current international human rights regime shows no competency in 
promoting human rights. Hence the China perspective is a probable 
approach for non-liberal states. 
 
Despite that China acts on its own, China’s liberalization is an international 
process. China’s economic development relies on capitals from liberal states 
and trade with liberal states. China also cooperates on the human rights 
issue as much as possible by ratifying most human rights documents, and 
protection of human rights were written into the Constitution in 2004.197 It 
is the international community’s responsibility to exert their influence in the 
right way to facilitate instead of to jeopardize the liberalization process. For 
the moment, the international community shall urge and help China in the 
land regime transformation process, and do not push China into democracy 
before the accomplishment of the process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
197 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 33. 
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